In Ituri Province, the FARDC are Unable to Distinguish CODECO Militias from Civilians

Mountains of Ituri province (Photo Monusco/Adeniyi Oluwo).

By Pierre Boisselet, Coordinator of the Kivu Security Tracker.

For four years, Djugu territory, in Ituri province, has been the site of a violent insurrection by the “CODECO” militia who the FARDC are unable to tell apart from civilians. Despite this, the authorities followed a nearly exclusively military strategy, further strengthened by the state of siege, at the risk of unwillingly bolstering their enemies.     

The Union des révolutionnaires pour la défense du Peuple Congolais (URDPC) is without doubt less well-known than other active armed groups in eastern DRC. And yet, this faction of the Cooperative for Development of the Congo (CODECO), which operates in Ituri province, is the most active armed group in all of eastern DRC. It has been implicated in at least 182 violent incidents since April, the month from when the Kivu Security Tracker (KST) started collecting data on this province.

During this period, it is true that the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) have killed more civilians – at least 600. However, the killings carried out by the URDPC are far from insignificant: at least 180 people have been killed by these militia members, which rank them as the second most deadly group for civilians.

The introduction of the state of siege on May 6 this year has not improved the situation. Even the DRC Armed Forces (FARDC) is frequently in difficulty. Between October 10 and 12, 28 soldiers were killed in violent clashes with the URDPC in the villages of Lipri, Ngangarai and Ngongo. On the 29th, CODECO militia members again killed 14 civilians in Gina.

So, how did we get here?

The Scars of History

CODECO is essentially active in Djugu, a territory of Ituri province long-scarred by community-based violence and tensions, effectively between the Hema and Lendu ethnic groups. This can be traced back to colonial times: steeped in racialist theories, the Belgian authorities supported the Hema community, whom they considered to be superior at the time, and who were mostly comprised of farmers (see the report “Violence and Instability in Ituri” by the GIC network), often to the detriment of the Lendu community, which is one of the largest of the province (just over 25% according to some estimates).

This heritage has shaped inequalities, particularly with regarding to land allocation and political power, and continues to have profound effects to this day. Djugu territory has four Hema “chiefdoms” (a type of collectivity with relative autonomy and hereditary power) whereas there are three Lendu “sectors” (bodies with less autonomy, with chiefs currently appointed by the state). The boundaries of these bodies are highly fragmented and isolate many of the Hema chiefdoms (below in orange) within Lendu sectors (in green).

Map taken from the “Administrative Organization Atlas of the Democratic Republic of Congo” by Léon de Saint-Moulin and Jean-Luc Kalombo Tshibanda, Centre for Social Action Studies, Kinshasa.

The racialist stereotypes developed under colonialism remain ingrained in the imagination of some of the current Congolese authorities. During an interview with the KST, a Congolese security forces officer stationed in Bunia described the Lendu in the following words: “they really are barbarians, bad guys, uncivilized Bantu. They are angry, they are there to get revenge, it’s in their blood. Even the Belgians said as much.”

After independence, the economic and political marginalization of the Lendu community continued, particularly during “Zairianization,” a process by which the Mobutu regime redistributed assets belonging to foreigners in the seventies. In Djugu, this included farms, given to influential Hema.

After the collapse of the Mobutu regime, and during the Second Congo War (1998-2003), Djugu territory escaped Kinshasa’s control, and became the site of extreme deadly conflict between community-based armed groups. Among them, of note were the Nationalist and Integrationist Front (FNI, essentially comprisred of Lendu) and the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC). Rwanda and Uganda, countries in conflict with one another, also contributed to feeding the conflict by supporting opposing armed groups.

The European Union’s operation “Artémis,” those of the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), as well as the dwindling influence of neighboring countries led to a considerable drop in the level of violence.

It is true that some armed groups remained active, such as the Patriotic Resistance Front of Ituri (FRPI) mainly composed of Ngiti (one of the constituent groups of the Lendu community). However, these were mainly based in the neighboring territory of Irumu and eventually signed a peace accord in February 2020 (in French).

“An Army, a Church, a Company”

As from 2018, a new wave of violence started in Djugu territory. Its origin is difficult to pinpoint, and the perpetrators have long remained unknown. However, some key events seem to have played their role, such as the death in unexplained circumstances of the Lendu priest, Florent Dunji, in July 2017, followed by protests by his community’s youth.

A first wave of violence occurred between the end of 2017 and March 2018, essentially against Hema villages, and a second, from September 2017, mainly against the FARDC. It was only in 2018 that the name CODECO, a reference to a former farming cooperative, emerged, as well as that of its leader, Mukwake Mambo, who was soon succeeded by Justin Ngudjolo – a cousin of the deceased priest.

According to Floribert Njabu, the moral authority of the FNI, who was able to enter into dialogue with the CODECO militia in 2020, members of CODECO present their movement as “an army, a church, and a company” all at the same time.

Specific beliefs and rites appear to have played a significant role in their mobilization. According to several sources, CODECO keeps specific days of rest – including Monday in particular. Data collected by KST partly confirms this tendency: out of 133 incidents started by the CODECO-URDPC logged between April 1 and October 13, only nine took place on a Monday, a number clearly lower than the average.

Number of incidents caused by the CODECO-URDPC since April, by day of the week

CODECO militia members do not clearly articulate their political demands, apart from their right to fight against the “harassment” by the FARDC who they accuse of having been “infiltrated” by foreigners, according to Floribert Njabu. Incidents caused by CODECO are not limited, however, to attacks against the FARDC: they have also committed many killings, particularly of Hema civilians.

Crucially, the authorities seem to be unable to discriminate between CODECO militia members and civilians from the community: four high-ranking officers whom KST interviewed for this blog post stated that both live side-by-side, inseparably in their view. A member of the former provincial government even described the ongoing conflict as a fight between the state and the Lendu community as a whole.

While there is certainly complicity between CODECO and some civilians, this assimilation is nevertheless refuted by many Lendu. Also, there are conflicts opposing different factions of CODECO, and militia members tax and commit abuses against Lendu civilians. The leader of the Bon Temple de Dieu (BTD, one of the CODECO factions), Thuwo, accused of committing abuse against his own community, was killed by members of the CODECO-URDPC on May 10.

Also, while there are armed groups comprising members of other communities in Djugu – particularly the Zaïre-Front Populaire d’Autodéfense en Ituri (FPAC, essentially Hema), they are relatively marginal in the conflict at this stage: they have only been identified as being implicated in four incidents in Djugu territory since April. “I have done all I can to stop the Hema from taking up arms,” explains Jean Bamanisa, himself from the Hema community on his mother’s side, and who was governor of Ituri until his removal in April 2021. “At the same time, this led the community to question their confidence in me because it was taking a long time to impose peace and stimulate development efforts.”

The Use of Force

In essence, the conflict can be summed up therefore as a confrontation between CODECO and the FARDC, with serious consequences for the territory’s civilians. The trend to criminalize the Lendu community in carries, in particular, the risk of promoting FARDC abuses against civilians. This is all the more significant that the Kinshasa government adopted a heavily militarized approach to this issue since Félix Tshisekedi arrived in power. This was initially the case with the launch of a military operation, “Zaruba ya Ituri” (“Ituri Storm”) following a visit by the president to Bunia in June 2019. The leader of CODECO, Justin Ngudjolo, was killed by the FARDC nine months’ later, in March 2020. However, this basically led to CODECO splitting into several factions with different strategies, which made any hope for dialogue much more complex. Apart from the URDPC, which is by far the most active faction and the above-mentioned BTD, there is also the Defense Force against the Balkanization of Congo (FDBC) or the Alliance for the Liberation of the Congo (ALC).

The operation was unsuccessful in bringing lasting stabilization to the situation. Faced with such a stalemate, the Kinshasa government appeared to have changed tactics by calling on former heads of Lendu groups, including Germain Katanga and Floribert Ndjabu, to try to enter into dialogue with CODECO militia members. This led to the signing of a unilateral deed of commitment by the URDPC (in French) and to a temporary drop in violence.

Nevertheless, in the absence of lasting dialogue and the disarmament program, the situation again deteriorated. In April 2021, Djugu became the most dangerous territory for civilians in all of eastern DRC, with 66 civilians killed, including 44 in incidents implicating CODECO-URDPC.

The introduction of the state of siege in Ituri and in North Kivu on May 6, 2021, again bolstered the military approach to the issue. FARDC activity has since increased markedly in Djugu, with highly publicized operations along National Road 27 (RN27) to dismantle the CODECO-held roadblocks.

Number of clashes implicating the FARDC in Djugu territory between April and October 2021

These operations, and the psychological effect of the state of siege, have managed to reduce violence in the weeks following its announcement. However, CODECO, which has not been dismantled, has retreated deeper into the territory. Many reports also mention a strengthening of their arsenal, including with PKM machine guns. After the respite of May, the number of civilians killed rose once again, attaining a level similar similar to that of April.

Number of civilians killed in Djugu territory, between April and October 2021

Despite its adoption in July, the new Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Reintegration and Stabilization Program (P-DDRCS) is not really seen as a credible strategy for Djugu. On the one hand, it does not seem able to implement concrete actions in the short term, particularly due to disagreements with the funders. On the other, several observers (Floribert Ndjabu, as well as MONUSCO intelligence sources) doubt that militia members can be persuaded by this program, which can offer neither amnesty, nor collective integration into the FARDC, nor have other specific requests entertained, due to its principles.

Once again, it is with an escalation in the use of force that the FARDC retaliated against an upsurge in attacks by the CODECO. Since July, they have used bombings by helicopter – a tactic which makes it particularly difficult to distinguish between civilians and combatants. Among the victims are several villages and civilians, such as in Kobu (7 civilians killed on August 18).

This attitude of widespread repression, which impacts the Lendu population, is partly accepted by some FARDC leaders (“People only are attracted to [those who are] the strongest. Therefore, we need to show that we are the strongest” explained a senior military officer to KST). Yet it has also led to the deaths of many FARDC (119 soldiers have been killed in Ituri between June and mid-September according to an internal document obtained by KST) and several officers recognize that currently the Congolese army has fewer troops than its enemies.

To mitigate for such losses and lack of troops, a contingent of the Republican Guard (GR) of approximately 1,200 men was deployed on September 10 in Bunia under the command of Brigadier general Jérôme Chico Tshitambwe. According to two officers when asked, it answers directly to the president’s office, which may cause difficulties in the chain of command, and deny them the field experience of soldiers who have been fighting for longer in the area.

The military approach to dealing with CODECO seems, in any case, to have also been adopted by the GR. On October 2, it launched an offensive in Lipri, which caused the deaths of eight soldiers and 21 civilians. The following day, the mother of the Yalala groupement chief, Live Malosi, was killed by the GR, who accused her of spying in the village of Kamba.

Has the FARDC changed its analysis of the conflict since then? Do they no longer have the means to pursue this offensive strategy? In any case, they appear to have again changed their approach, sending a delegation representing Chief of Staff Célestin Mbala to meet with the URDPC in Linga on Saturday, November 6. According to Radio Okapi, they were to propose to CODECO the “cessation of hostilities and [its integration into] the peace process.”

 

Does the New Disarmament and Demobilization Program Stand a Chance of Success? 

Collected firearms for destruction in Goma (North Kivu) in November 2013 (Photo MONUSCO/South African Battalion).

By Reagan El Miviri, Analyst at the Kivu Security Tracker, and Pierre Boisselet, Coordinator at the Kivu Security Tracker.

In early August, DRC President Félix Tshisekedi appointed a national coordinator to head the new Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Reintegration and Stabilization Program (P-DDRCS). This type of program seems vital to place eastern DRC on the road to peace. However, all previous DDR attempts have largely failed. Will this time prove any different?

On August 7, 2021, President Tshisekedi appointed Emmanuel Tommy Tambwe Rudima to the position of National Coordinator of the new Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Reintegration and Stabilization Program (P-DDRCS), established one month earlier.

This announcement had been expected for months, even years. Since the failure of the third “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration” program in eastern DRC (DDR3) with a planned 2015 launch, but which was never effectively implemented, the country had been without a program of this kind. In December 2019, the UN Security Council had already “called upon” the Congolese government to “appoint a senior coordinator to address Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.” 

This type of program is therefore vital for progress on the path to peace in eastern DRC.

Why is a DDR Program Needed?

The largely military approaches, encouraged by Félix Tshisekedi since his arrival as president in January 2019, have still not resulted in the expected outcomes. At times, they have even worsened the situation, such as the “large-scale” offensive launched against the ADF at the end of October 2019, and which was followed by a wave of civilian killings, unprecedented since that of 2014-15.

The “state of siege” implemented in the provinces of Ituri and of North Kivu from May 6 this year, has not had the expected results either to date. This has in essence consisted of the transfer of large swathes of civil jurisdiction over to military or police governors, administrators and mayors. But civilian killings have continued since it came into being: at least 723 civilians have been killed by armed actors the North Kivu and Ituri since May 6 (cross-checks are still ongoing concerning the further killings occurring during this period). The ADF, the deadliest of the 122 armed groups listed by the KST in eastern DRC, are behind most of the killings (they are implicated in the deaths of at least 396 civilians). In recent months, its sphere of action has shifted towards the territories of Irumu and Mambasa in Ituri province. The armed forces and police are themselves implicated in the deaths of at 65 civilians.

As a result, the state of siege, which had the near-unanimous support of the political class at its launch at the end of April, is now facing criticism. Pointing to the lack of results and demanding that the minister of defense come before them to explain the situation, 90 national members of parliament boycotted the vote to prolong the state of siege on August 3.

In this context, could the new P-DDRCS or Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Reintegration and Stabilization Program bring peace to eastern DRC?

The negotiations entered into in recent months, between the FARDC and the armed groups of the Petit Nord (the territories of Nyiragongo, Rutshuru, Masisi, Walikale, and the south of that of Lubero), have resulted in surrenders. However, none of the main militia heads has, until now, handed himself in to the authorities, which makes such progress reversible. Also, previous surrenders show that such advances are rarely long-lasting without a properly funded and organized DDR program, which provides real support for combatants. Former combatants of the Nduma Defense of Congo-Rénové (NDC-R), billeted in Rumangabo (Rutshuru territory, North Kivu), have. for instance, carried out multiple lootings of the surrounding villages, such as on May 25 this year. Many of those who have surrendered have also returned to the bush and rejoined their armed group. Additionally, in the absence of a DDR program to replace them, most attempts at creating peace and mediation agreements in recent years have never got off the ground.

Since 2003, at least three DDR programs have been launched nationally, without any decisive progress. A significant number of the current members of armed groups have gone through such DDR programs before taking up arms again in a movement of “circular return” and a “recycling of rebels.”

Does this new DDRCS program have any chance of success when the previous ones have failed?

A Controversial New Coordinator

Initial reactions to the appointment of Tommy Tambwe to the position of national coordinator have not been very encouraging. His profile as a former senior member of the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD, of which he was Vice-President of South Kivu, in particular) and a leader of the Alliance for the Liberation of Eastern Congo (ALEC), both rebel movements backed by Rwanda, have caused hostility from members of civil society. Dr Denis Mukwege, a Nobel Prize winner, shared his “caution” and believed that “it was time to break with policies whose aim was to give promotions to those who should be brought to justice. In a press release, the NGO Human Rights Watch (co-founder of KST) opined that this appointment raises “serious concerns.”

Regarding armed groups, the news was hardly better received. The Collective of Movements for Change (CMC), one of the main militia coalitions in the Petit Nord and, as such, one of the significant targets of the P-DDRCS, declared their hostility to Mr. Tambwe who they describe as a “puppet” and “mercenary of the foreign invaders of our country.”

In South Kivu, Tommy Tambwe’s province, this appointment also seems to be problematic. Civil society organizations as diverse as the Solidarité des jeunes fuliiru (SOJEF) and the Banyamulenge Mutual Societies Coordination Committee have denounced his selection as the head of the P-DDRCS.

The new P-DDRCS National Coordinator rejects such criticism. During an interview with KST in Kinshasa on September 1, he promised that, as from his first trip to eastern DRC, his delegation would “improve the living conditions of those who had already surrendered,” and that “many new combatants would surrender and be welcomed.” This trip was to have taken him to the provinces of “Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Tanganyika and Maniema.”

Will the Donors Support the New Program?

Another challenge is to convince the donors to back the program. Tommy Tambwe has stated that the Congolese state will contribute its own funds to this program. “We have recovered 1.1 million USD from the budget lines of the STAREC and PN-DDRC,” [two institutions replaced by the P-DDRC], he specified to KST. “This would be used to become operational immediately but is insufficient. We are currently in talks with the executive to find further funds from the already approved 2021 budget. And we will also develop the budget for 2022.”

The level of state support therefore remains to be defined. There are justified fears that it remains insufficient without the help of foreign donors. DDR3 in particular had failed on that issue: potential funders, chastened by the suspicions of corruption and misappropriation of funds in previous programs, had believed that the necessary guarantees had not been forthcoming.

Does the international community have a positive view, at this point, of the new P-DDRCSy? Upon the presentation of the idea of a community DDR by the governors of North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri in October 2020, the Ambassadors of the European Union, United States, Great Britain and Canada had expressed their support.

However, an initial hitch occurred during the publication of the ruling establishing the P-DDRCS on July 4. A Western diplomat questioned by KST was unpleasantly surprised to discover that the structure of the program allocates less decision-making to the three regions the most affected by insecurity than he expected. He fears that centralizing the program jeopardizes its effectiveness.

Tommy Tambwe’s profile has also raised concerns in Western diplomatic circles in Kinshasa; such concerns have been strengthened by the reaction of civil society and armed groups. However, no foreign country has publicly criticized his appointment, leaving the door open for collaboration. According to a source close to the program, funders will not try to change the President’s mind on the subject of his appointment. It remains to be seen, however, whether they are willing to fund the program.

On August 24, in Kinshasa, Tommy Tambwe met with eight diplomatic delegations (those of the United States, United Kingdom, European Union and of several of its member states, in particular). Several sources who took part in this meeting have indicated that it went rather well: delegations had the feeling that their concerns had been taken on board by the new P-DDRCS Coordinator and his team. It is expected that they will be invited to join the steering committee.

But not all issues have been solved. According to a source at the World Bank, it has already rejected the idea of directly funding the P-DDRCS. This doesn’t mean that no funding will be provided for projects within the framework of this program, but the Bank – and all the diplomats in communication with KST – appear to want to avoid funding the national structure as such. In the long term this could cause problems by weakening the capacity of the P-DDRCS to administer its entire program, in particular with carrying out tasks such as the identification and monitoring of demobilized combatants. These funders however have not ruled out providing technical support to the program, along with MONUSCO, which has also undertaken to support the new program.

Which Strategy Should be Adopted? 

For the P-DDRCS to work, it also needs a strategy capable of having learnt from previous failures.

It has a few arguments in its favor. Firstly, the political context has changed compared with previous programs: after 18 years of Joseph Kabila’s reign, the rise to the head of the country of a president who has not taken part in armed conflicts in the last 20 years is a window of opportunity to convince armed groups to lay down their weapons.

The struggle against Joseph Kabila’s regime had long been the corner stone of the armed groups’ leader’s justification for taking up arms. Ever since the arrival of President Félix Tshisekedi in January 2019, several groups (in French) had spontaneously expressed the wish to join a DDR process to “serve” the country.

Also, if we were to wonder about the relevance of the state of siege in fighting against insecurity in the east, this is a measure of the will of the government to do something about this issue. As underlined by the government’s spokesperson in a Débat Africain podcast, the state of siege banks on its psychological effect: it shows the government’s commitment to put an end to armed group activities in the provinces concerned.

Another advantage of the P-DDRCS is that it is the fruit of the merging of STAREC and the National DDR Program, two institutions which were previously under two different ministries (Planning as regards the STAREC and Defense as regards the PN-DDR), which led to redundancies and conflicting competences.

However, who conducts security policies in eastern DRC has not been entirely clarified. This remains split between the P-DDRCS, under the presidency, the Ministry of Defense, led by Gilbert Kabanda, and the National Oversight Mechanism (NMS) of the Addis Ababa Framework Agreement, led by Claude Ibalanky.

Lastly, there remains the task of implementing a clear and convincing strategy. This program’s vocation is to be community-oriented. This is itself an interesting idea. In “Untangling the Gordian knot of insecurity”, the Rift Valley Institute proposed that in 2013 the previous program had been insufficiently community-oriented. The authors noted that by only targeting combatants, the DDR had undermined reconciliation efforts since “the communities that they return to had the impression that those who had taken up arms were being rewarded by giving them money and professional training.

During his first trip to eastern DRC, Tommy Tambwe plans to “implement in each province “Consultation Frameworks for Peace Program Support” (CCAPs) with the authorities, civil society, customary chiefs, religious confessions, tribal mutual societies, NGOs, youth, women, etc.,” he told KST. “We do not want people to come and say afterwards that they had not taken part in the process,” he added.

“However, the strategy itself remains to be developed along with MONUSCO specialists,” he clarified.

The Dilemma Posed by Reintegration

This strategy will invariably collide with the social reintegration of combatants into communities and the issue of their possible integration into the armed forces.

Providing economic alternatives to former combatants is an essential part of reintegration into the community. However, such alternatives should be fit-for-purpose. In the past, reintegration programs led former combatants towards ill-adapted activities (work in mills, hairdressing, etc.), since they didn’t have the skills required to take on such roles.

Also, the ruling establishing the DDRCS specifies that integration into the armed forces will only be possible on an individual basis. This is a means of rejecting collective integrations, which have occurred in the past. Such military integration is seen as a red line by the international community and by civil society, as it perpetuates the cycle of violence and impunity by incentivizing the taking up of arms to eventually benefit from this type of program.

However, this intransigence may well be difficult to apply, particularly for the armed groups which have already started a demobilization process. This is the case, for instance, of the Union of Patriots for the Liberation of Congo (UPLC) or the Patriotic Resistance Front of Ituri (FRPI), which have received the promise that its members will be integrated into the army, along with recognition of their ranks. This is the basis upon which they accepted to remain billeted in camps. The hope of amnesty and integration into the FARDC is also often one the main motives for armed groups to surrender. According to some reports, the historic head of the Nduma Defense of Congo-Rénové (NDC-R), Guidon Shimiray, has recently proposed this type of condition prior to considering his surrender.

The new leaders of the P-DDRCS are faced with multiple challenges: convincing skeptical funders of their ability to develop an effective program; lead it to its successful implementation; and breaking with past practices whilst finding a way of motivating combatants to surrender. This will be no small challenge.

Has the State of Siege Improved Security in the Eastern DRC?

A hearing in progress before the military court in Uvira (South Kivu) on May 16, 2021. (Photo MONUSCO/Justice Support Section, Bukavu).

By Pierre Boisselet, Coordinator of the Kivu Security Tracker.

Despite what the Congolese authorities announced, there have been few military operations since the onset of the state of siege, and civilian security has deteriorated in North Kivu and Ituri provinces.

Regaining control of National Road 27, of the Mbau-Kamango trunk road, “freeing” of various localities in the territories of Djugu and Irumu from the clutches of armed groups, “neutralization” of the members of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) or their associates… Based on official statements, you might think that multiple victorious offensives had been launched by the army since the start of the siege on May 6, and that the security situation is about to come under control.

Data collected by the Kivu Security Tracker (KST) however, portray a different picture of the situation. Since the state of siege was decreed by President Félix Tshisekedi on April 30, civilian security as a whole has, in fact, gotten worse in North Kivu and Ituri provinces. KST has recorded the deaths of at least 223 people there in May, compared with 198 in April.

Number of civilians killed in the provinces of North Kivu and Ituri in April and May 2021

The killings in Boga and Tchabi, in Irumu territory, which led to 55 civilian deaths, during the night of May 30 to 31 (the deadliest day ever recorded by KST), were largely responsible for this upswing. However, from one month to the next, the death toll also increased in Beni territory (74 civilians killed in May, compared with 47 in April) and in Mambasa territory (35 civilians killed in May, compared with 3 in April).

It is also difficult to detect a genuine uptick in FARDC activity in the same period. KST logged 29 clashes involving the FARDC in May, compared with 26 in April. No head of an armed group identified by KST has been killed or arrested by the FARDC or the Police – a Mai-Mai head, Jackson Muhukambuto, was arrested on June 8, 2021, but by the Congolese Institute for the Conservation of Nature (ICCN).

Highly-localized Progress 

So what about the government’s recent announcements? At the start of June 2021, for example, Kinshasa announced the pacification of the Mbau-Kamango trunk road, in the territory of Beni. Yet the reopening of this trunk road had already been announced in September 2020 by the then minister of defense, and no incident had been recorded on this road by KST in 2021. It seems improbable for the state of siege to take credit for this…

However, there have been FARDC announcements that have resulted in concrete action in the field. The Congolese army, for instance, has retaken all of National Road 27, which links Bunia to Uganda. At least ten members of the Codeco-URDPC group, which was occupying various localities along this road, have been killed. Since then, this group has largely left this road and incidents have fallen drastically.

The FARDC also retook the town of Nyakunde, close to Marabo (Irumu territory) and several surrounding villages from the Chini ya Kilima-FPIC. Eleven militia members were killed and fourteen arrested. However, it remains difficult to know whether this offensive is genuinely linked to the state of siege: it started on May 2, that is, after the measure was announced, but before it came into force. This offensive took place at a heavy cost for civilians, as we will learn below.

Lastly, although some ten ADF members were effectively killed close to Halungupa (Beni territory) on May 9, the FARDC lost at least as many men on the days following. Above all, it has not brought the number of killings perpetrated by the ADF under control. Quite the contrary: KST recorded the deaths of 98 civilians in attacks attributed to this group in May, that is, nearly twice that of April (53).

Number of civilians killed by the ADF in April and May 2021

Additionally, a series of killings were perpetrated close to Biakato, in Mambasa territory, an area in which the ADF have never been present until now. They therefore appear to be pursuing retaliation against civilians and growing their area of operations – a process ongoing since the start of the large-scale operations against them, launched in October 2019.

Locations of the killings perpetrated by the ADF in April (to the left) and May (to the right) 2021

As concerns extra-operational measures, the FARDC announced that they had arrested three soldiers, suspected of links with the ADF, even if they refused from providing any details. Regional intelligence service coordination efforts were continued, with the organization of a workshop in Goma at the start of May, even if this was in all likelihood scheduled well before the state of siege announcement. This kind of measure may well have a positive impact in the long term. However, in the absence of more details on their substance, it is difficult to evaluate it. Their possible effects are in all cases not visible for the time being.

Persistent Absence of Joint Planning

Nor has the attitude of the UN Mission to the DRC (MONUSCO), the target of protests in North Kivu in April, radically changed on the ground. It carried out an aerial bombardment of an ADF base on May 14, which had not occurred for several years. However, according to several UN sources, this operation had been planned before the state of siege decree.

MONUSCO remains committed to reforming its Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), by creating four “Quick Reaction Forces” of 150 blue helmets each, comprising Kenyan, Nepalese, South African, and Tanzanian troops, who would be capable of more rapid interventions. The Tanzanian faction is already operational but the new units will only be fully operational in August.

Above all, in the persistent absence of joint planning of operations – an absence which remains to this day unaltered by the state of siege – no truly joint MONUSCO-FARDC operation is possible, nor is any large-scale unilateral operation by the blue helmets planned. MONUSCO appears for the time being therefore, limited to reacting to attacks by armed groups in the best of cases. Regardless, KST has not recorded any FIB-initiated clashes with the ADF since 2018.

Lastly, problems relating to the absence of a working disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program remained. Several former members of the NDC/R Bwira group, stationed in Rumangabo (Rutshuru territory), looted the neighboring village of Kayenzi to find food four days after the visit of the military governor of the province, Constant Ndima Kongba.

Uptick in FARDC Abuses

Concomitantly, there has been a marked uptick in the number of civilians killed in incidents involving the FARDC: 32 cases were recorded in May, compared with 17 in April. Several particularly serious incidents occurred in Ituri. After the FARDC retook the town of Nyakunde, they killed seven civilians during combing operations in the village of Nongo on May 2 and eight civilians in the villages of Banikasowa, Ndenge I and II on May 15. In their statement, the FARDC claimed that all of those killed on May 15 were militia members. However, the presence of women and children among the victims, witnessed by several sources, lends little credence to this statement. Beyond the abuses themselves, this type of violence can have a lasting adverse effect on the population’s confidence in the FARDC, a much-needed ingredient of success for any counter-insurgency operation. Many of the area’s inhabitants fled the area following the onset of operations.

A woman was also killed after refusing the advances of a soldier in Nizi (Djugu territory) on May 16, a civilian was killed after having been taken by a militia in Djaiba on May 16 and a civilian was killed during a raid by the FARDC against the mine at Malindi-Buo (Mambasa territory) on May 20.

As the problems relating to respect for human rights are longstanding, and as the operations against the Chini ya Kilima-FPIC started before the entry into force of the state of siege, it is difficult to certify that these new abuses are linked to this measure. However, it cannot be excluded that at least some of the incidents are related to a sentiment of heightened impunity on the part of some members of the FARDC following the state of siege announcement.

Beyond the military impact, the state of siege also has—perhaps above all— psychological, legal and political effects, which are likely to impact dynamics of violence in the long term.

These have enabled the FARDC to take control of local entities’ civil institutions (the provinces since May 6, but also of towns and territories since May 26). And the many statements by the new governor of North Kivu on the state of finances and revenue generation in his province may suggest that the control of the related financial resources is a matter of particular concern for the new authorities.

At the national level, the state of siege and the resulting security and military issues are hardly debated in parliament. At the national assembly, this measure–which still lacks a legal framework–was extended for two weeks at the request of the government. 334 MPs officially voted for the measure, with hardly any debate. President Félix Tshisekedi now plans to pass an authorization law to allow him to renew the measure without consulting parliament, according to reports of one of his discussions with senators, which would limit any regular assessment.

This situation could also be used by the government to adopt unpopular measures. This is specifically the case of military cooperation agreements that President Félix Tshisekedi has long wished for but whose implementation has always been thwarted by lack of political support.

Thus, the DRC and Uganda have signed an agreement to “stabilize” the east of the DRC according to the Ugandan government. However, this has not been made public, and nothing has been submitted to parliament, as the Constitution demands (in French) for this type of agreement. Discussions with Rwanda, which have been ongoing for several months, have continued. But “it has become practically impossible to publicly demand respect for the Constitution on such subjects,” explained a member of parliament anonymously. “The president’s followers would accuse us of being traitors to the nation.” In the absence of transparency on these agreements, it is difficult to assess their possible consequences. However, in the past, some foreign army operations on Congolese soil have led to human rights violations without long term solutions.

Unanimity on the state of siege has somewhat faltered since the Boga and Tchabi killings, during the night of May 30 to 31. Following this incident, the military governor of Ituri province was forced to recognize that until then he had essentially been focused on “assessing the situation” and the “implementation of all the teams.”

On June 1st, the Minister of Defense, Gilbert Kabanda, stated that the situation would be different within two weeks, after the government had “moved some men” and unblocked further resources. It has not, however, specified a budget or a timetable.

Is the “State of Siege” a Step in the Right Direction?

Group of FARDC soldiers, on April 19, 2011, in North Kivu (Sasha Lezhnev/Enoughproject.org)

By Pierre Boisselet, Coordinator of the Kivu Security Tracker.

President Félix Tshisekedi has decreed a “state of siege” for one month, which will place the military and police in charge of the provinces of Ituri and North Kivu. Purely military approaches, however, have until now failed. But what should be done to restore peace to eastern DRC?

We now know more about the “state of siege”. Starting on May 6, and lasting initially for 30 days, the civil authorities of both provinces have been replaced by the military and the police. This includes the governors and vice-governors. Provincial government, provincial assemblies, local authorities and civil courts, have been suspended. The military has also been given special powers: including the power to prohibit or prevent publications, gatherings and even the presence of people they consider to be harmful to their actions. According to a UN source, these measures were taken without consulting the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO).

The head of state has appointed two lieutenant generals to lead the provinces affected by the state of siege: Johnny Nkashama Luboya for Ituri and Constant Kongba Ndima for North Kivu. Like many FARDC officers, both have been involved in rebellions in the past. Johnny Nkashama Luboya was the head of military intelligence for the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) at the start of the 2000s. His latest post was that of FARDC Commander of the First Zone of Defense. Constant Kongba Ndima was also known as the “board wiper”, in reference to the particularly violent operation led by the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) in Ituri at the beginning of the 2000s. At the time he was a general in that rebellion. His previous post in the FARDC was that of Deputy Commander of the General Staff in charge of administration and logistics.

There remain some areas of uncertainty in this measure. Dozens of FARDC officers are still to be appointed. However, the logic is relatively clear: to give full authority to the Congolese army in these provinces. The message is just as clear: President Félix Tshisekedi is aware of the deterioration of the situation and wishes to wipe out the armed groups in the east. This is an extremely ambitious program, therefore, for a measure also described as time-bound.

It is perfectly true that the situation is becoming worse for civilians in eastern DRC. This trend is very clear from the data collected by the Kivu Security Tracker (KST) on the provinces of North and South Kivu. In 2018, KST recorded 914 civilian deaths caused by armed actors. In 2019, this toll had risen to 1070. In 2020, it was 1569. And 2021 has started more or less on the same trajectory as 2020.

Number of civilians killed by armed actors per year in the Kivus since 2018

From this viewpoint, Félix Tshisekedi’s determination is understandable. He has made restoring peace in the east a central element of his communication both during his 2018 electoral campaign and since the start of his presidency. The head of state’s focus on this issue is, in itself, a good thing: Congolese and International political leaders often neglect the problems which plague eastern DRC.

This measure is also a response to very serious concern among public opinion. According to a poll (to be published) by the Congo Research Group (CRG) and the Bureau d’Études, de Recherches, et Consulting International (BERCI), carried out on March 19 and 20, 2021 across the country, 20% of respondents believe that security should be the government’s priority, which ranks this issue in second place behind “social/living conditions”, and ahead of “economy/jobs”. Throughout the month of April, there were protests (including in North Kivu) which not only called for MONUSCO to leave but also for the president to keep his word.

The Military Option

The voice of the protesters appear, therefore, to have been heard. But is the state of siege the right solution to their concerns? To find out, a useful starting point would be to take stock of what has already been done to address problems in the east under Félix Tshisekedi’s presidency.

Since the beginning of his mandate, the head of state has appeared to approach the east’s problem from an essentially military angle. He declared that he was ready to “die” to restore peace. When he tried to forge a regional coalition to restore security in September and October 2019, this was designed as joint command body for the region’s armies to plan military operations in eastern DRC.

Under the authority of the president, operations such as Zaruba ya Ituri (Ituri Storm) in the Djugu territory in June 2019, or the “large-scale” FARDC offensive against the ADF involving some 20,000 troops in October 2019 have been launched. Yet MONUSCO were not consulted or involved in the planning of these offensives and in the end, the region’s countries did not take part, since the joint command body project failed.

Concomitantly, it is true that non-military initiatives have been implemented, such as the Murhesa ceasefire process, community dialogue in the high and middle plateaus of South Kivu, or the attempt to rebuild the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program with a newfound focus on “communities”. However, in general the central government was not the instigator of such initiatives. Although sometimes it has endorsed them – with varying degrees of enthusiasm, particularly during the period when it was itself divided –until now it has not shown the will to prioritize such initiatives. The new “community” focused DDR approach, for example, was launched by eastern provincial governors. In 2020 Félix Tshisekedi publicly supported it and announced the appointment of a national coordinator to manage the process. Several international donors committed to DDR have expressed their readiness to financially support the scheme. But the decree providing for its implementation, which he has received, remains unsigned. This delay is all the more damaging given that the aim of the “state of siege” is to enable more offensives against armed groups: it would have been useful to first ensure that a framework was in place to deal with disarmed combatants.

It is clear: since the start of Félix Tshisekedi’s presidency a military approach has been adopted. How successful has it been? Data collected by KST calls into question its effectiveness and could even suggest the approach has been counterproductive in some territories.

A Counterproductive Operation

In Djugu territory, where the Zaruba ya Ituri Operation was launched in June 2019, KST data is limited as data collection only began in April 2021. However, initial indications are concerning: in April, Djugu was the most dangerous territory for civilians in eastern DRC. KST recorded 66 violent civilian deaths in the space of one month (more than the 47 civilian deaths in Beni territory over the same period). Djugu, which is only one of the 18 territories monitored by KST, accounted for 33% of all civilian deaths in April.

How does this compare to Beni, the territory targeted by the “large-scale” operation launched in October 2019? The FARDC leadership has very quickly announced the retaking of main ADF bases. However, data mapped by KST suggest that most of the combatants were able to flee to other areas. Some towns located on the borders of Beni territory, such as Mandumbi, Mamove or in the sector of Rwenzori, which until then had been relatively unscathed by ADF violence, saw a dramatic increase in civilian killings after the launch of the operation.

Location of killings carried out by the ADF in Beni territory before the “large-scale” intervention (June 2017-October 2019) and since then (November 2019-April 2021)

When the number of civilians killed in Beni territory is exposed and explored, the operation also appears to have been counterproductive until now. A monthly average of 24 civilians killed by armed actors between June 2017 and October 2019 escalated to an average of 65 following the start of the operation.

Number of civilians killed by armed actors in Beni territory per quarter since July 2017

A small but significant part of this was also due to an increase in violence by the FARDC and the National Congolese Police (PNC): either institution is implicated in the deaths of 4 civilians on average per month since the beginning of the operation, compared with 2 prior to it being put into effect.

However, abuses recorded in Beni territory are still overwhelmingly committed by the ADF – in so far as those responsible can be told apart. In all likelihood, the aim of such killings is to discredit and put pressure on the Congolese authorities, to divide the forces pursuing them and to divide society as a whole. In this way the ADF appear to want to inhibit FARDC operations so they can return to their safe havens. However, until now the Congolese government has not been able to contain this strategy: MONUSCO was the target of mass protests in November 2019 and in April 2021, resulting in clashes which led to at least 25 people being killed in North Kivu province.

Further Dangers

The results of the military approach favored by President Félix Tshisekedi, which are at best mixed, raise concern as to the consequences of the “state of siege”. This measure is in fact a continuation and strengthening of the method applied until now, rather than a new approach. This exceptional state also entails further dangers. The military, which have the capacity to prohibit protests, publications and to determine whether certain people are allowed to stay, will have greater autonomy and less accountability to justify their action than before. Both generals appointed as heads of the provinces by Félix Tshisekedi are also suspected to have been implicit in human rights’ violations according to a UN document seen by KST, which could jeopardize their collaboration with MONUSCO, since the mission operates in such matters under a policy of “due diligence”. This might be all the more damaging given the ongoing reform of MONUSCO’s Intervention Force Brigade (FIB) which will allow it to carry out interventions more frequently. At least some of the Kenyan troops, whose arrival was announced by Félix Tshisekedi during his visit to his counterpart, Uhuru Kenyatta, on April 21, are to be integrated into the FIB. However, to be able to act effectively, cooperation with the FARDC is vital.

Moreover, some FARDC members have ambiguous relationships with armed groups: complicity exists, sometimes at a high and structural level, as the CRG has evidenced concerning the Nduma Defense of Congo-Rénové, NDC-R, an armed group operating in North Kivu). Some members of the FARDC also profit from illicit economic activities. Reducing checks and balances by limiting the right to protest and criticize the operations might once again exacerbate the situation. Additionally, it must be questioned whether it will it be in the interest of the members of the military who now yield provincial power – and control of its associated resources – to bring violence to an end, which would most likely result in them losing their positions. It is therefore possible that the state of siege destabilizes the area, rather than stabilizes it.

Comprehensive Strategy

This does not mean, of course, that nothing should be done to deal with the situation in eastern DRC. Congolese public opinion concerns about the situation are legitimate and call on everyone to try and come up with answers.

Firstly, the Congolese government needs to formulate a comprehensive strategy, which goes beyond exclusively military solutions. This should be based on an in-depth and detailed analysis of the causes of the conflict and the role that each series of actors play in its perpetuation. The aim would be to identify the conflict’s deep-rooted drivers and to provide relevant solutions.

The situation’s causes are numerous and varied: the absence of state and public services in some areas, a lack of institutions that are accepted to solve local conflicts by non-violent means and that are perceived as neutral, the lack of armed groups member’s interest to leave their ranks, the perpetuation of illicit economic channels at a provincial and regional level, the complicity with armed groups at various state levels, the difficulty in cooperation with MONUSCO, the insufficient means and training provided to the FARDC and PNC…

Such an analysis would in particular lead to questioning the role of some members of the army and police in the conflicts, including in abuses, illicit economic channels and their links to armed groups. What is needed is to strengthen the means by which transparency is ensured and such excesses limited: for example, effective and incorruptible military inspections and tribunals, the capacity of the justice system to investigate such matters, a respected freedom of the press, the ability of civil society to denounce abuses without fear of repression, etc.

The role of the FARDC is both inescapable and indispensible. However, this must be achieved in a context which ensures its professionalism and inclusion within a comprehensive strategy. Also, in order to dismantle armed groups and put in motion a transitional demobilization and justice programme at national and regional level, reforms and action plans of other state services are required, particularly for the intelligence service, the PNC, the justice system and in diplomacy.

Efforts to define such a strategy have been made. The mechanism for monitoring the Addis-Abeba Agreement has for example led to the publication of a roadmap in September 2020. This should be supplemented and clarified, but has the merit of insisting on pursuing military and non-military approaches side-by-side and provides some useful analyses and proposals. However, similarly to the community DDR program, its adoption is pending a presidential decree.

Defining and implementing a comprehensive strategy is a long-term endeavor, which requires the constructive, patient and ongoing involvement of the highest levels of government. It will only deliver results in the long term at best. Yet President Félix Tshisekedi is in an advantageous position to address the problem. He now has a large political majority and a government willing to break with past practices. His new Minister of Defense, Gilbert Kabanda Kurhenga, has made the “restoration of ethics” within the FARDC his priority. Moreover, there is a new head of MONUSCO, Bintou Keita, and a new commander, General Marcos De Sa Affonso Da Costa, has been appointed. In September, he will head a strengthened and reformed FIB. There is now a window of opportunity for a more comprehensive and effective policy.

Will Intercommunity Dialogue Restore Peace in the Highlands of South Kivu?

Mikenge, in the highlands of South Kivu on June 1, 2020. Photo Monusco / Alain Likota.

An agreement was signed on March 31, 2021 in Kinshasa, between the representatives of the different communities of the high and middle plateaus of South Kivu. While modest in scope, the dialogue organizers recognize that the agreement alone will not be enough to restore peace. But is this right direction?

By Pierre Boisselet, Coordinator of the Kivu Security Tracker.

This blog post is a translation of the original French version published on April 8, 2021. A new government of the DRC was announced on April 12, 2021.

March 31 marked the end of the “intercommunity dialogue on peace, security and development in the high and middle plateaus of Fizi, Mwenga et Uvira.” Over the course of three days, representatives of the Babuyu, Banyindu, Barundi, Bavira, Babembe, Bafuliru, and Banyamulenge communities met in the Béatrice Hotel in the Congolese capital. This conference brought to an end a process led by the international NGO, Interpeace, with the support of the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), to de-escalate the situation in the highlands of South Kivu.

Volatile Area

This area, which has been volatile for some decades, has seen an upsurge in violence since 2016, and above all since 2018. It is the main home of the Banyamulenge community, whose members traditionally are cattle-herders (the transhumance of cattle is often a source of conflict) and speak a language close to those spoken in Rwanda and Burundi. This historically marginalized and discriminated against (in French) community saw some of its members join the ranks of Paul Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), then armed groups backed by Rwanda, such as the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo-Zaire (AFDL) and the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) in the 1990s and 2000s, which committed abuses against civilians in South Kivu, sometimes in the context of local conflicts.

This fed into a deepening of the mistrust and discrimination against them and encouraged the formation of armed groups by other communities, particularly of the Mai-Mai type. From 2018, the situation considerably deteriorated following abuses committed by the Banyamulenge armed group, “Ngumino” (“let’s stay here”), against civilians, including the traditional chiefs of other communities (such as the assassinated Chief Munyindu Kawaza Nyakwana), the presence of Rwanda National Congress (RNC) rebels of Kayumba Nyamwasa in the area, and the decree confirming the creation of the rural commune of Minembwe led by a Munyamulenge mayor, thereby escaping the authority of the South Basimunyaka groupement.

Many Abuses

A significant coalition of armed groups, comprising in particular the Mai-Mai Yakutumba, Ebu-Ela Mtetezi or Biloze Bishambuke (from “indigenous” communities) and Burundian rebels of the Résistance pour un Etat de droit (RED-Tabara), who Burundian authorities accuse of being backed by Rwanda, assembled to fight the Ngumino. These groups committed many abuses against Banyamulenge villages, setting them on fire and looting their cattle, thereby forcing them to live in a few enclaves, such as Minembwe. On their side, the Twigwaneho “self-defense” militias have become the Banyamulenge community’s principal armed movement, which has also been responsible for committing just as many abuses against civilians belonging to other communities, leading to population displacement. Last August, the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office estimated that the total number of displaced (across all communities) in the area amounted to 110,000 (in French).

Since January 2020, Interpeace, an international peacebuilding NGO, has tried to solve this problem through a community-oriented process. The meeting which took place March 29 to 31 is, in effect, the culmination of a process which started at the beginning of last year, including a ceasefire in March 2020 (with little lasting effect on the ground) and a series of “intercommunity” dialogue events.

According to the conclusions of the Kinshasa meeting, representatives of different communities noted that there were both points of convergence and persisting differences, and made recommendations and commitments, such as “to disengage from foreign armed groups,” “lay down arms […] at the end of a ceasefire process” and “raise awareness among their respective populations of the need to avoid the possession of weapons and to work for peace and security.”

Read the conclusions of the dialogue (PDF, in French)

These commitments are quite broad and vague, and therefore fail to clearly designate the actors, means, or timetable for their implementation. However, participants hope that the government will use them to form the basis of its “roadmap” for restoring peace. For this to stand a chance of success, the roadmap should move well beyond recommendations, by including in particular the reform of local administration and the security services, and a functional process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR).

The outcomes of the Kinshasa agreement were not, in any case, immediately apparent. Representatives of the Bavira community even directly rejected the conclusions of the process, believing that they had been marginalized. Moreover, several security incidents have occurred in the highlands since, such as at Rubarati on March 31 (where clashes took place between the Twigwaneho and some Mai-Mai groups), on April 1 at Kitanda (where a Munyamulenge woman was killed) or on April 4 (where a subsequent clash between the Twigwaneho and the Biloze Bishambuke occurred).

Weakness of Interventions to Bring Peace

Dialogue alone will not, therefore, restore peace. And this was not the aim of the organizers. But is it a step in the right direction? Past examples are far from encouraging. Between 2006 and 2020, at least 15 local agreements were signed in eastern Congo, according to a study by Claude Iguma Wakenge and Koen Vlassenroot published in July 2020. These agreements were implemented by such diverse actors as NGOs (Life & Peace Institute, in particular), the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in DR Congo (MONUSCO), or even Swedish or Swiss sustainable development agencies. “The general failure to make local agreements tangible reveals the weaknesses of peace interventions in eastern DRC,” the writers noted.

In a forthcoming report analyzing the conflict in the highlands (entitled “Mayhem in the mountains”), Judith Verweijen, Juvénal Twaibu, Moïse Ribakare, Paul Bulambo, and Freddy Mwambi Kasongo are even more critical of this type of process. According to them, “intercommunity dialogue can unwittingly result in worsening rather than mitigating the dynamics of the conflict and violence.” The risks raised include hiding internal conflicts, reinforcing the placing of blame for violence on communities (rather than on the armed groups themselves) and thereby increasing stigmatization. This logic was in plain sight at the Béatrice Hotel if some findings are to be believed, such as the accusation that the “Barundi were facilitating clandestine migrations and the infiltration of foreigners.”

“The argument put forward in this report is no doubt interesting, but in such a crisis situation, people identify very strongly with their community,” remarked a UN source who wished to remain anonymous. “This reality cannot be denied and the intercommunity model can be useful.”

Interpeace in any case tried to take past failings into account. Aware of the divisions within communities, the NGO organized a series of “intercommunity” dialogue events for each of the communities in 2020 in order to level out the disagreements and identify representatives through consensus. However, this had some adverse effects: the conclusion of the Bembe intercommunity meeting in March 2020, for example, described the Banyamulenge as “Rwandan so-called Banyamulenge,” which was inconsistent with easing tensions.

Lack of Coordination

On the other hand, the process did reproduce some issues identified in previous studies, including the lack of coordination between the various initiatives. While Interpeace was leading its process in the highlands with British funding from January 2020, another parallel and concurrent initiative was underway to obtain a ceasefire between the armed groups of South Kivu: the Murhesa process, led by the NGOs Search for Common Ground (SFC) and the Initiative for a Cohesive Leadership (ILC), with funding from the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Sweden, which led to the signing of another ceasefire (also largely ignored) in September 2020. The creation of a peacebuilding coordinator position within the forum of international NGOs to try to solve the problem is reported to be ongoing.

However, there were other issues, such as the lack of participation by the authorities. Most of the “recommendations” by the dialogue’s participants were addressed to the national government, such as the management of the issue of the rural commune of Minembwe, implementing a DDR process, or establishing a roadmap. All the participants with whom we were able to speak insisted on the fact that the dialogue would only have positive effects if the government effectively engaged with all stakeholders. Instead, the national ministers present at the dialogue (the Minister of the Interior, Gilbert Kankonde and Defense, Aimé Ngoy Mukena) belong to the outgoing government and could be replaced by the next government.

Will the next ministers of the interior and defense transform these recommendations into an action program? It remains unclear, and it would certainly have been preferable for the dialogue to have been held under the auspices of the new government. However, the funding awarded by the FCDO for this project stops on March 31, which led to the timing of the meeting being brought forward. Discussions took place with a view to postponing the end of the funding (and therefore the meeting) to May, but were unsuccessful. “The presidency was involved and it was the head of the Civil House of the Head of State, Bruno Miteyo, who moderated the dialogue,” explained a source within Interpeace. “Future ministers will be briefed and will continue the process.”

The other category of actors capable of bearing on the conflict is the armed groups themselves. However, in the case of the Kinshasa discussions, there were very few among those invited, they only made vague commitments and above all, without any certainty as to their implementation on the armed group who they were supposed to represent. The group of Michel Rukunda, aka Makanika, who has become one of the main armed actors of the highlands, whose numbers were recently boosted by the arrival of former FARDC officers, was not represented, for example. According to a source close to the organizers, bringing more representatives of armed groups to Kinshasa would have created legal and security issues, but the other participants had insisted on holding the meeting in the capital so as to engage the national elite.

So, despite everything, could the process started by Interpeace lead to a breakthrough? One of the conditions would be that MONUSCO, the armed groups, and the next Congolese government converge to take up its findings and develop them into a complete roadmap, including the far-reaching reforms needed to solve the current situation. This dialogue was surely not the last.

In the Highlands of South Kivu, a Political Impasse and a Chain of Desertions

Un soldat des FARDC à Minembwe, en octobre 2020 (DR)

Since the start of the year, at least four senior FARDC officers have deserted to join an armed group in the highlands of South Kivu. Their lack of confidence in President Félix Tshisekedi, now alone at the head of the DRC, and his ability to solve the area’s problems appear to have been determining factors.

By Pierre Boisselet, Coordinator of the Kivu Security Tracker.

In 2020, the desertion of FARDC Colonel Michel Rukunda, aka Makanika, had been at the forefront of Congolese public opinion. Since the start of 2021, four senior officers have already left the ranks of the Congolese army according to Kivu Security Tracker (KST) sources. The most emblematic example is that of the desertion of Colonel Charles Sematama, commander of the 3411th Regiment of the FARDC in Kitchanga (Masisi territory, North Kivu), at the end of February (in French). However, other examples include Lieutenant-Colonel Mufoko Jolie Rungwe, Major Patrick Muco or Major Senanda.

Similar to Makanika, these four officers are from the Banyamulenge community and have all moved to the highlands of South Kivu and have joined the “self-defense” community militia Twigwaneho (“let’s defend ourselves” in Kinyamulenge).

Some of the desertions may have been motivated by personal concerns. Colonel Charles Semata, for example, in the latest interim report by the UN Group of Experts, was reported to have cooperated closely with armed group head Gilbert Bwira and was part of the group of officers called by Kinshasa for training. This may have played a part in him feeling threatened to be arrested.

However, the scale of these desertions suggests a deeper problem. According to a western diplomatic source, at least six officers and 20 soldiers are reputed to have left the FARDC in 2021 to join the Twigwaneho. Having emerged in recent years, this armed group was behind a “self-defense” movement comprised of Banyamulenge civilians from the area’s villages or the diaspora. Though largely decentralized, a more organized group has coalesced in Makanika in Kamombo (Fizi territory). The latter group has inflicted heavy losses on the Congolese army like at Tuwetuwe (where six FARDC soldiers died in July 2020).

Do such desertions presage the birth of a large-scale rebellion against Kinshasa’s hold on South Kivu?  For the time being, this rebellion seems highly unlikely. The arrival of officers from the army’s ranks might make it easier for the Twigwaneho to organize an uprising. However, at the same time, several Twigwaneho combatants have defected, including nine who surrendered to the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) in recent weeks according to one of KST’s UN sources. “Eight of them are Hutus from Kalehe territory (South Kivu), who were promised money for tending cows. But in the face of attacks by Mai-Mai groups, they were unable to defend themselves.” For the time being, the movement seems to have found it difficult to broaden recruitment beyond its community of origin. Moreover, Banyamulenge armed groups remain divided: the leadership embodied by Makanika is being contested by Shyaka Nyamusaraba, the head of a smaller group, the Ngumino (“let’s stay here” in Kinyamulenge). These two groups clashed in Rukuka in November 2020. Above all, the vast majority of Banyamulenge officers in the Congolese army, particularly the highest ranking, have remained faithful to the government in Kinshasa.

The hard-to-reach region of the highlands (peaking at over 3400 meters in altitude), however, remains a breeding ground for Banyamulenge (sing. Munyamulenge) armed groups. Since the emergence of the “Abagirye” (derived from guerrier, French for “warrior”) in the 1960s, the highlands have been the birthplace of successive armed movements, fueled by the minority’s feelings of exclusion, insecurity, and discrimination. Traditionally made up of cattle breeders, the Banyamulenge’s spoken language is very closely related to that of its neighbors, Rwanda and Burundi, which feeds the suspicion that they are in collusion with foreign powers. Moreover, contrary to other peoples in the area who consider themselves “indigenous” (the Bafuliru, Babembe, Banyindu, or Bavira), no Munyamulenge traditional chief has a chiefdom, grouping or sector (the local administrative entities governed by customary power). Also, as they are not in the majority in any electoral district, the Banyamulenge are rarely elected. For decades, all of this has fed the desire to create an administrative entity in which they would constitute a majority.

The situation considerably deteriorated in the 1990s. The integration of some young Banyamulenge into the ranks of Paul Kagame’s RPA (Rwandan Patriotic Army) reinforced the perception that the community as a whole was serving foreign interests. In 1995, the transition parliament in Kinshasa and the authorities in Uvira territory officially excluded the Banyamulenge from the Zairian nation and called for their expulsion, which led to new acts of discrimination, looting, and further rallying to the APR.

Prior to the invasion of the country by the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFLC) of Laurent-Désiré Kabila, which was supported by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, a vanguard comprising of Banyamulenge had been sent to take position in the highlands. The vanguard caused a terrible cycle of killings, retaliation, and discrimination. This trauma is still keenly felt to this day. Due to these events, every armed group made up of Banyamulenge is suspected of inciting a regional war. Others have gone so far as to accuse the Banyamulenge of the  “balkanization” of the Congo – a baseless theory that says there is an international conspiracy to divide the DRC into several autonomous states.

Some members of the Banyamulenge community have attained positions of power due to their AFDL membership and involvement in the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD). The RCD was an uprising backed by Kigali which controlled a large part of Eastern Congo for a long time. This rise to power is exemplified in the case of Azarias Ruberwa, who was Secretary General of the RCD. After the Sun City Agreement, which put an end to the war in 2002, Ruberwa became Vice President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo then later a very close advisor to President Joseph Kabila. Many Banyamulenge combatants also became senior officers in the FARDC through this agreement and through successive integrations of rebels in its ranks.

Despite the Sun City Agreement, violence never really ceased in the highlands of South Kivu. Since 2016, and even more so in 2018, the violence has intensified. In addition to the main causes of the upsurge in violence, there are three other causes to consider. The first being the abuses committed by the Ngumino against civilians and the traditional chiefs of other communities (such as Chief Munyindu Kawaza Nyakwana who was killed). Second, the open-arms policy by these same groups of Rwandan rebels of the Rwanda National Congress (RNC) of Kayumba Nyamwasa. And third, the 2018 decree confirming the creation of the rural commune of Minembwewhich did not fall under the authority of the South Basimunyaka grouping. These causes gave rise to powerful hate speech against the Banyamulenge and has reignited the rhetoric of “balkanization,” particularly taken up by the opposition politician Martin Favulu and several representatives of the Catholic Church.

On the ground, a significant coalition of armed groups has come together to fight the Ngumino. This coalition comprises of the Mai-Mai Yakutumba, Ebu-Ela Mtetezi or Biloze Bishambuke (from the “indigenous” communities), and Burundian rebels of the Résistance pour un Etat de droit (RED-Tabara) who are backed by Rwanda according to Burundian authorities. The coalition has committed several atrocities against the Banyamulenge by setting their villages on fire and looting their cattle (an essential asset in the highlands of South Kivu), thereby forcing them to live in a few enclaves such as that of Minembwe. On the Banyamulenge side, the “Twigwaneho” militias have become the main armed movement and have in turn committed just as many abuses against civilians of other communities present in the highlands, which has also led to population displacement. Last August, the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office estimated that the total number of displaced (across all communities) in the area amounted to 110,000 (in French).

All the above however does not explain why this wave of desertions from within the FARDC only occurred in 2021. The arrival of the Mai-Mai Yakutumba (the most powerful armed group in South Kivu) in the highlands, whose presence has been confirmed since the start of the year, may have played a role, by increasing the perceived threat.

However, above all, it appears to coincide with the break-up of the national political coalition between the Heading for Change (Cap pour le changement in French (Cach)) of President Félix Tshisekedi and the Common Front for Congo (Front commun pour le Congo in French (FCC)) of his predecessor Joseph Kabila. The main Banyamulenge political leaders on the national political scene (the Minister of Decentralization, Azarias Ruberwa, and the MP Moïse Nyarugabo in particular), are part of Kabila’s FCC, and have not joined the Sacred Union of the Nation (USN) as the president had hoped after the break-up. “The president did not even invite us to national consultations,” said Moïse Nyarugabo when interviewed by KST.

Although the authority of Ruberwa and Nyarugabo is contested by part of their community, no new political leader of national stature has truly emerged. Of the 48 members of the Provincial Assembly of South Kivu there are no Banyamulenge members. “Ruberwa was contested, but we knew that he had Kabila’s ear,” explains a community leader who wishes to remain anonymous. “Since Kabila lost power, we have lost any political outlet.” This is especially the case since Azarias Ruberwa is currently out of the country receiving medical treatment in South Africa.

Many Banyamulenge also doubt Félix Tshisekedi’s sincerity and capacity to defend them. In an interview with BBC Gahuza, deserter Colonel Charles Sematama justified his decision by referring to the president’s broken promises to stabilize the country (in French).

Tshisekedi’s close ties with the Rwandan authorities also arouse deep mistrust. It is true that the community is divided and the regional alliances of all the factions are unknown. However, many Banyamulenge have tense relations with the Kigali government. This tension was clear when the March 23 Movement (M23) was created in 2012. Virtually no Munyamulenge soldier joined this new Kigali-supported uprising led by Tutsis of North Kivu. A significant number of Banyamulenge officers, such as General Jonas Padiri, had even been at the forefront of the FARDC fighting against the movement.

Nonetheless, security cooperation between the DRC and the Paul Kagame-led Rwanda is thriving more than ever since Tshisekedi broke off his alliance with Kabila. Rwandan military delegations traveled to Kinshasa (in French) on at least two occasions since the start of the year (the last time was on Monday March 15th when some ten delegates, mainly Rwandan senior officers, traveled to the DRC). Additionally, a Congolese delegation, led by the president’s security advisor, François Beya, traveled to Kigali in February (in French). “We are here to say that we are united and that there will never be conflict between us,” declared Beya at the time.

Similarly, Félix Tshisekedi’s personal involvement in the issue of the highlands has been criticized by the community. In a January 2020 speech in front of the Congolese diaspora in London, Tshisekedi courageously confirmed that the Banyamulenge were Congolese (in French). Booed by the public, he has not dared declare it again since.

Then, in October 2020, he became even more unpopular in the Banyamulenge community. Major controversy ensued after Ruberwa attended the official mayoral appointment ceremony in Minembwe because no other mayor of a newly created rural commune had ever received the same treatment. In the face of the national uproar caused by this ceremony, the president had suspended the process and announced the creation of a scientific commission designed to decide on its legitimacy and propose solutions.

“This premature appointment is undoubtedly a political error. But in the end, we have to admit that Kabila gave us the rural commune of Minembwe and that Tshisekedi has taken it away from us,” complained a Munyamulenge community leader.

Five months after this announcement, the scientific commission has still not been assembled, let alone made any proposals to end the current crisis. In the absence of political process, there is a real danger that more Banyamulenge soldiers choose the force of arms.

Divisions between Tshisekedists and Kabilists Paralyze the State in Eastern DRC

In Kanyaruchinya, near Goma, July 15, 2013. (Monusco Photo by Sylvain Liechti)

The division between President Felix Tshisekedi’s camp and that of his predecessor, Joseph Kabila, prevents, for the time being, the adoption of a coherent strategy to stabilize eastern DRC.

By Pierre Boisselet, Coordinator of the Kivu Security Tracker.

2127 civilians killed, 1450 abducted, 938 kidnapped… The Kivu Security Tracker (KST) recorded record-high deaths, abductions, and kidnappings for ransom during the first twenty months of Félix Tshisekedi’s presidency. This toll is even heavier than that of the last 20 months of his predecessor, Joseph Kabila (1553 civilians killed).

The difference is due mainly to the resurgence of killings perpetrated by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)– the very one that President Félix Tshisekedi had promised to “definitively exterminate” during a “final offensive” in October 2019.

In order to fulfill this promise, and, more broadly, to eliminate all foreign armed groups present in the Kivus, the Congolese president first attempted to set up a regional military coalition. He organized several meetings in Goma with neighboring countries’ armies’ chiefs of staff in September and October 2019.

Already at that time, Joseph Kabila’s political coalition, the Front Commun pour le Congo (FCC), opposed this project. And the deep divisions between Rwanda on the one hand, and Uganda and Burundi on the other, as well as the opposition of a large part of Congolese public opinion, finally killed the project.

But on October 31, 2019, the FARDC, most of whose generals were appointed during Kabila’s time, launched a unilateral offensive. MONUSCO, which had not been involved in the planning, did not participate.

One year later, results on the ground are sorely lacking. Despite the announced reconquest of certain ADF strongholds, the operation has largely failed to put this Islamist group out of action. In fact, the ADF has committed far greater massacres since the beginning of the offensive (more than 640 civilians killed in attacks attributed to the ADF in the past year, compared to 195 the year before). On the ground, the FARDC offensive is now largely at a standstill. The Congolese military seems to have become the target in this conflict: of the eight clashes between the FARDC and ADF recorded by the KST in August, for example, the ADF were the initiators in seven cases. “When the president wanted to launch this offensive, the generals accepted it because it allowed them to get the funding that went with it,” a senior FCC official commented to the KST “but they never really believed in it.”

This offensive against the ADF illustrates, among other things, the lack of a coherent, coordinated strategy among the various Congolese and international political leaders to stabilize eastern DRC. Félix Tshisekedi’s rise to power has not, for the moment, made it possible to remedy this.

In Kinshasa, a multitude of Congolese institutions play a role in the politics of the country’s east. However, these institutions are divided between the coalition of the president and that of his predecessor. The Minister of Defense, Aimé Ngoy Mukena, is close to Joseph Kabila. But the Deputy Minister of Defense, Sylvain Mutombo Kabinga, is a fierce supporter of Tshisekedi, as is the Minister of the Interior, Gilbert Kankonde. The National Monitoring Mechanism of the Addis Ababa Agreement (MNS), which is expected to publish a roadmap for stabilizing the country, is headed by Claude Ibalanky. Ibalanky, a close associate of Tshisekedi, comes from the diaspora and does not have extensive experience dealing with conflict dynamics in eastern DRC. “We do not know who is in control” a European diplomatic source revealed in an interview with the KST. In his speech to the nation on October 23, President Tshisekedi cited “issues relating to peace and national security” as the main reason why there are “differences that persist between parties” to the ruling coalition.

Indeed, not all personalities playing a role in the east are pulling in the same direction. This has been evident of late in the “hauts plateaux” (highlands) of South Kivu, where a conflict pitted several militias from the Fuliru, Bembe, Nyindu, and Vira communities against those from the Banyamulenge community. This conflict, which has gone through repeated cycles of violence for several decades, has resumed with renewed vigor since Tshisekedi’s presidency: the main belligerents (Mai-Mai René, Ebu Ela, Biloze Bishambuke, Twirwaneho, Gumino and Makanika) have killed at least 81 civilians in the past year, a sharp increase over the previous year (35 killed), according to KST figures.

In August, Tommy Thambwe Rudima, a former member of the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) rebellion, traveled to the highlands to try to defuse the conflict. He is affiliated with the NGO Interpeace, and apparently also held a presidential mandate, which a source in the head of state’s office confirmed to the KST. However, at the MNS, a source interviewed by the KST said that he was unaware of this mission, and even went so far as to suggest that Thambwe Rudima was probably an imposter.

Then, in mid-September, Tshisekedist Deputy Minister of Defense Sylvain Mutombo traveled to Murhesa, near Bukavu, to participate in talks between armed groups organized by the NGOs Search for Common Ground (SFCG) and the Initiative for a Cohesive Leadership (ILC). This initiative was funded by the governments of the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland, but was criticized by other donors and many sources in MONUSCO as being premature. Among the participants were representatives of the main belligerents in the highlands who eventually signed a very fragile ceasefire on September 16.

During the following days, relative calm prevailed in the region. But on September 28, Defense Minister Aimé Ngoy Mukena and Decentralization Minister Azarias Ruberwa, both FCC members, traveled to Minembwe to participate in the official induction of Gad Mukiza, a Munyamulenge, as mayor of the rural commune. This ceremony, held at a time when other local entities in South Kivu were still waiting for their administrative status to be formalized, was perceived as a provocation by a large part of the Congolese public. As a result, Félix Tshisekedi himself visited Goma on  October 8, promising to “cancel what has been done” in Minembwe. Since October 19, violent clashes have resumed in the highlands.

The rivalry between Tshisekedi coalition’s Cap pour le changement (CACH) and the FCC is also evident – and deleterious – in the development of a new Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program. While many of the armed groups in eastern DRC justified their struggle as being against Joseph Kabila’s presidency, Felix Tshisekedi’s term in office has sparked a real wave of voluntary demobilizations since the beginning of the year. Most of these combatants found themselves in cantonment camps. However, due to a lack of resources allocated to these camps, particularly food, most of them fled and returned to the bush.

With bitter memories of previous DDR programs, which they considered to be ineffective and non-transparent, donors did not release the funding that was hoped for for “DDR 3.” “The state was not fulfilling its part of the contract, which was to feed the cantoned combatants,” explained a source close to the dossier.

Félix Tshisekedi has therefore promoted a new approach: so-called “community-based” DDR. This was initially launched by governors of South and North Kivu, as well as Ituri, and is coordinated by Clovis Munihire, under the acronym “CIAP-DDRRRC”: Commission interprovinciale d’appui au processus de désarmement, démobilisation, réinsertion, reintegration et réconciliations communautaires. Its promoters want to change DDR methods, for example by avoiding the problematic DDR stage of confinement in military camps. The idea would now be for them to remain in their communities of origin. This approach also rules out any collective reintegration of combatants into the FARDC.

After having raised a certain amount of skepticism among the DRC’s main donors and MONUSCO, the project now seems to have the consent of the majority from this group. Most western ambassadors supported the new approach after a meeting with the president on October 22, where no FCC minister was present.

In fact, the president’s camp is hampered by the presence of people close to Kabila in key positions. Until now, DDR programs have been coordinated by the Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for Eastern DRC (STAREC), the Congolese agency that is supposed to implement these programs with the international community. It is also this structure that controls the donor-funded Stabilization Coherence Fund (SCF).

STAREC is coordinated by Alain Kasindi, a man reputed to be close to Néhémie Mwilanya, the National Coordinator of the FCC, and is placed under the authority of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Planning, Elysée Munembwe, who is also from the FCC.

According to a source related to the case, the Tshisekedi camp sees STAREC as a tool to capture funds for the benefit of the FCC. According to a UN source, the president intends to create a new structure, attached to the presidency, which would allow him, among other things, to control STAREC. Thus, in Goma the president announced the forthcoming appointment of a National Coordinator for community DDR.

The issue of funding for these projects, however, remains unresolved. During his visit to Goma, the president announced that $50 million would be allocated to DDR. According to a source at the World Bank, however, this money was not intended to finance DDR-C, but the “Social Fund for the DRC” to support communities affected by violence. Faced with a fait accompli, however, the Bank finally announced “a dedicated stabilization project to support the governors’ initiative in the east,” the parameters of which have yet to be defined.

In addition, the DRC is eligible for new funding under the World Bank’s Prevention and Resilience (PRA) allocation. This funding, provided by European diplomatic sources, totals $700 million. However, the Congolese government must meet several conditions in order to release these funds, including the publication of a comprehensive strategy for stabilizing the country. To date, the World Bank believes that the Congolese government has not met this condition.

Why Violence in the South Kivu Highlands Is Not ‘Ethnic’ (And Other Misconceptions About the Crisis)

Students from a school near Minembwe, June 2007. (Photo Julien Harneis)

Judith Verweijen is a lecturer at the Department of Politics & International Relations at the University of Sheffield (UK). Her research looks at the interplay of armed mobilization, violence and conflicts around natural resources. Her main focus is on eastern DRC, where she has conducted extensive field research since 2010.

On August 10, 2020, the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office in the Democratic Republic of Congo (UNJHRO) published a report on the unfolding crisis on the highlands (Hauts Plateaux) at the intersection of Fizi, Uvira, and Mwenga territories in South Kivu. Curiously, the report focuses on a limited area of the highlands only: it omits the Bijombo area, where fighting first escalated mid-2018, after three years of conflict. 

Despite this omission, the report gives an indication of the enormous toll that the crisis has taken: it documents the destruction of at least 95 villages, 128 deaths from summary and extrajudicial executions,  47 victims of sexual-related violence, and the looting and killing of thousands of cattle. This violence has led to a dire humanitarian situation, with over 110,000 people displaced. 

The UNJHRO report does not provide much analysis of the drivers of this violence. It acknowledges that the conflict and its origins stem from multiple factors at the national and sub-regional level, but is limited to the inter-community aspect. This is unfortunate, as it advertently gives off the impression that this is the most important factor. 

Similar to other conflicts in eastern DRC, the crisis on the Plateaux is characterized by profound complexity. It involves a range of different drivers of conflict and violence that play out at different levels–from the local to the sub-regional. Narratives emphasizing simple explanations provide only one piece of this complex puzzle. Here are three such narratives and why on their own they are incomplete, if not inaccurate. 

1. The violence on the Hauts Plateaux stems from “ethnic” or “inter-communal” conflict

Ethnic identity has featured prominently in explanations for the recent violence. From this perspective, it stems from animosities between the Banyamulenge on the one hand, and groups that label themselves “autochthonous”–including the Babembe, Banyindu, Bafuliiru, and Bavira on the other. 

This narrative needs to be nuanced. There are certainly numerous conflicts on the Plateaux that pit Banyamulenge against other groups. These conflicts relate to contestations around local authority and control over land and resources, including the taxation and regulation of markets, mines, and cattle movements.

However, these conflicts do not always turn into armed violence. Violence is committed first and foremost by armed groups and “local defense” militias. True, these armed actors claim to defend particular ethnic communities and are often supported by members of these communities seeking protection. Yet most ordinary citizens are not involved in planning, organizing, directing, inciting, or committing violence. We therefore cannot ascribe such violence to “ethnic groups” writ large. More importantly, we must pinpoint and analyze when, why, and how conflicts turn violent. As an extensive body of research shows, violence labelled as “ethnic” is often driven by a range of other motives and objectives, including inter-personal conflict, economic and political competition and disputes about land and other property. 

Another problem with the “ethnic conflict” narrative is that it assumes there are two homogeneous blocks: the Banyamulenge and groups calling themselves “autochthonous.” Yet these groups themselves have numerous internal divisions, which are reflected in the plethora of armed groups linked to either side. 

There are at least three Banyamulenge armed groups: the Twirwaneho–a coalition of local militias, which are also developing a political branch; the Gumino, led by Shaka Nyamusharaba; and an armed group commanded by FARDC deserter Michel Rukunda, aka “Makanika,” which has numerous Banyamulenge youth from the regional diaspora (Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi) in its ranks. The armed groups linked to the Babembe, Bafuliiru, and Banyindu are even more numerous. They include the Mai-Mai of Ebuela Mtetezi–which encompasses Bembe commanders who previously had their own groups, such as Aoci and Ngyalabato; the Mai Mai Mulumba; the Mai Mai “Mupekenya” under the command of Kati Malisawa, and a range of mostly Fuliiru and Nyindu groups operating under the label “Biloze Bishambuke.” The latter include the groups of Ilunga, Kashomba, Mushombe, and in the Minembwe area, those led by Luhala Kasororo and Assani Malkiya. 

These armed groups operate in broad coalitions, but there are regularly tensions and occasionally even clashes between groups that are supposedly on the same side. For instance, on August 2, the Biloze Bishambuke under the command of Ilunga clashed with the troops of  Kati Malisawa near Maheta village, allegedly due to a dispute over stolen cattle. This indicates that certain armed group leaders, and the political actors that help mobilize and support them, also have different agendas than protecting their communities. They often aspire to enhancing their own political and economic clout and some have national political aspirations. This further undermines the argument that the violence is primarily driven by “ethnic conflict.” 

2. The violence on the Hauts Plateaux is related to the creation of the commune rurale of Minembwe 

Another popular explanation for the violence, which is closely linked to the ethnic conflict narrative, is that it stems from the creation of the “rural commune” of Minembwe– a non-customary decentralized local governance entity. The commune became operational at the start of 2019, following decrees issued in 2013 and 2018, and the nomination of its leaders in February 2019. 

The commune is undoubtedly a source of conflict. It is located in Fizi territory, on lands that members of the Babembe community consider to be theirs. They therefore see the creation of the commune as encroachment on or the occupation of their ancestral grounds. Some have also contested the designation of the mayor, who is  Munyamulenge. But most importantly, the creation of the commune is seen as the first step for the resurrection of the territoire (sub-provincial administrative entity) of Minembwe.

During the Second Congo War, the rebel administration of the Rwanda-backed Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (Congolese rally for Democracy or RCD) created  Minembwe territory, which encompassed large parts of the Hauts Plateaux and the adjacent Moyens Plateaux. The territory fulfilled a longstanding wish among the Banyamulenge, whom the colonial authorities had denied a chiefdom or groupement–local governance entities generally formed along ethnic lines. Consequently, they became subject to rule by customary chiefs from other communities. The territory, where they dominated the administration, resolved this. Moreover, anticipating future elections, the territory, which is an electoral district, would have allowed the Banyamulenge to increase their political representation in parliament. Being a minority in each of the three territories that comprise the Hauts Plateaux, they had struggled to get their candidates elected. Finally, the territory brought local administration closer to the people in this isolated region, allowing them to obtain birth certificates and other official documents there. 

The creation of the territory–which was formally abolished in 2007– was heavily contested by other groups, who perceived it to break up their ancestral lands. In addition, it appeared to confirm a conspiracy theory that the Banyamulenge were the vanguard of a foreign invasion attempting to expropriate and displace “autochthonous” groups, and usurp their local authority. Members of these groups therefore have bad memories of Minembwe territory. In addition, it has left a legacy of leadership conflicts. Numerous former appointees have continued to behave as de facto local authorities, even if they no longer hold an official position. 

For these reasons, Minembwe territory has a highly symbolic function, as a marker of division and violence. The commune rurale evokes similar strong feelings, being deeply inscribed in struggles around local authority and identity. It has also become a national political affair. While prominent Banyamulenge leaders––including Azarias Ruberwa, currently the minister of decentralization–– endorse the commune, many Bembe, Fuliiru and Nyindu politicians, such as Pardonne Kaliba, have denounced it. The commune has also stirred heated debate among Congolese in the diaspora. 

Yet the violence on the Hauts Plateaux, as well as the emergence of most of the armed groups involved in the current fighting, predates the creation of the commune. Violence on the Plateaux has been a regular occurrence since 1996. The current cycle started in 2016 and escalated mid-2018. This escalation first occurred in Bijombo groupement. This groupement is not included in the commune rurale, whose surface is many times smaller than the (abolished) territory of Minembwe. Bijombo also has distinct conflict dynamics. The latter revolve to a large extent around the position of the chef de groupement–for which there are multiple contenders linked to different ethnic groups. Another site of significant violence is the Itombwe area, which is equally not included in the commune. 

In sum, even though it is an important source of conflict and figures prominently in the belligerents’ discourses, the commune is only one of many factors in the current fighting. It does not explain why and when armed groups emerged on the Plateaux and who they target with their violence. 

3. The violence on the Hauts Plateaux is the result of foreign interference

As documented by, inter alia, the UN Group of Experts on the DRC and Radio France Internationale, the coalitions of belligerents fighting on the Plateaux include foreign armed groups, notably the Burundian groups Résistance pour un état de droit au Burundi (RED-Tabara) and Forces nationales de libération (FNL), as well as the Rwanda National Congress (RNC). They have occasionally also included soldiers linked to the governments of neighbouring countries, which have moreover hosted recruitment and supply networks. At the same time, eastern DRC has a history of wars kickstarted by foreign interference. The conclusion that the trouble on the Plateaux results from foreign meddling is therefore easily drawn. 

Yet this explanation glosses over the many conflicts around local authority mentioned above. It also overlooks the role of provincial, national and diaspora political actors in supporting armed mobilization and polarization. Moreover, the language of “foreign interference” is somewhat misleading. It suggests that all power resides on the side of foreign forces, who manipulate Congolese intermediaries as they see fit.

This reading obscures that Congolese armed group leaders and political actors have significant room for maneuver regarding what foreign forces they ally with. Occasional shifts in such alliances testify to this leeway. These shifts also demonstrate that such alliances are mutually beneficial. Through their foreign allies, Congolese groups gain in military capabilities, for instance, by acquiring heavy weaponry. This, in turn, allows these groups to better advance their position within conflicts around local authority and access to resources. As such, the involvement of foreign actors cannot be seen in isolation from local dynamics of conflict and violence; they are interwoven and mutually reinforcing. That said, foreign interference has clearly contributed to a significant escalation of the violence, even if it has not caused it. 

What, then, is at the root of this terrible violence? There are a number of interlocking mechanisms at work. First, the narrative of “ethnic violence” has become a self-fulfilling prophecy: all types of conflicts and incidents of violence are seen primarily through an ethnic lens, even if there are also other factors at work. This activates a second mechanism, which is the attribution of collective responsibility for individual acts of violence. As a result, civilians are attacked in retaliation for violence committed by armed groups. This blurring of the boundaries between armed groups and civilians is an important driver of cycles of revenge violence. Widespread impunity has further aggravated this: as individual perpetrators are not held to account, the blame is shifted towards groups as a whole. 

Another key mechanism is militarization, or the tendency by local leaders and politico-military elites to resort to force in order to gain the day in disputes and power struggles. This does not only involve politicians, business people and military leaders in the DRC, but also governmental actors and other elites at the level of the Great Lakes Region. 

The emergence and persistence of armed groups, however, is not only the result of militarization: it also stems from local security dilemmas related to mutual distrust between communities. The presence of armed groups seen to defend particular ethnic communities prompts members from other communities to equally sustain armed groups. The same logic propels these armed groups to maintain a military balance of power, which motivates attacks to weaken the enemy. Local security dilemmas crucially hinge upon a generalized lack of trust in the state security forces, which are accused of partiality by all sides. It is also rooted in a history of violence dating back to the Congo Wars, which has instilled bitter feelings and deep distrust between different groups. 

These various mechanisms play out at different levels and become mutually reinforcing. For instance, the involvement of foreign armed actors is in part the result of the strategies of politicians and military leaders operating at the national level. Once present, these foreign forces exacerbate local security dilemmas and conflicts around local authority and resources. In this manner, dynamics of conflict and violence at different levels become entwined. Monocausal explanations, such as the lazy trope of “ethnic violence” do no justice to this complexity. In fact, they may exacerbate the situation. They further essentialize identities and legitimize attributing responsibility for armed group violence to civilian communities. When describing violence in eastern DRC we must therefore try harder to find an adequate analytical language. 

[Guest blog] The NDC-Rénové Kicks Out Guidon, Who Kicked Out Sheka

Guidon Shimiray’s stronghold was located in Walikale territory (photo). Monusco / Kevin Jordan

Christoph Vogel is a researcher and investigator specializing in DRC’s armed groups. A former member of the UN security council group of experts, he currently works with the Conflict research programme based at London School of Economics (UK) and Ghent University (Belgium)

 

On the night of July 8, near Pinga in one of its main headquarters, the NDC-Rénové announced the dismissal of its top commander, Guidon Shimiray Mwissa. In a communiqué signed by the movement’s spokesperson Désiré Ngabo, the NDC-R announced that Guidon’s deputies Gilbert Bwira and Mapenzi Likuhe are taking over the leadership of the group.

The communiqué’s wording is particularly striking: it reproduces nearly verbatim Guidon Shimiray’s own 2014 language when he took control of Sheka Ntabo Ntaberi’s former NDC rebellion in Walikale area of North Kivu.

A recent Congo Research Group report meticulously documented how the story of the NDC–R is in many ways a blueprint to understand conflict and armed mobilization in the eastern Congo. More often than not, the emergence, evolution and demise of belligerents in that region is guided by a combination of drivers and factors. In the NDC and NDC-R’s case, this has been the imbrication of politics, business, and social relations, as well as the broader geopolitical surroundings in which the movement was able to operate. While it is unclear at this point where the NDC-R is headed, and who will lead it, some interesting lessons can be drawn from the group’s trajectory and its (more or less) sudden split.

Big or small, most armed groups in eastern Congo’s highly fragmented (in)security landscape – recent counts suggest well over a hundred clearly identifiable belligerents – are sensitive to developments around them. These include local and provincial politics, the role and positioning of customary leaders and army commanders in their area, and many other dynamics. The case of the NDC and the NDC–R illustrates just how much the movement has, historically, reacted to external interference in the shaping of its own structure and strategy. Military, customary, and political elites were crucial in helping Guidon and Bwira to take over from Sheka, and for Mapenzi to leave Janvier Karairi’s APCLS and bring most of its troops into the NDC-R. Judging from this tradition, it would be highly unlikely that Bwira and Mapenzi would topple Guidon without similar backing.

One big question now is that of troop strength. Neither the Congo Research Group, nor Congolese analysts, nor the the UN Group of Experts have provided clear numbers, but it is probably safe to say that the NDC-R has somewhere between 1000 and 5000 elements. (Yes, this range is huge, but specific head counts tend to be incorrect, as many past examples show.) These include semi-autonomous allies such as the UPDI-Mazembe under Kitete Bushu. How many of these troops (and their respective stocks, positions etc.) will remain loyal to Guidon? Who will remain with Mapenzi and Bwira? Answering this question will surely take days.

As of now, less than 24 hours following the split, the only clear thing is that internecine fighting has emerged in a number of places, including Pinga, Mweso, Kashuga, and near JTN/Katsiru (although this list may not be exhaustive). In some places, the Congolese army – not known for taking a particularly tough stance on the NDC–R in the past – is engaging units of the group. In other places, the coalition linking Nyatura CMC with FDLR and APCLS is taking back positions recently lost to the NDC–R. As in other splits, it is likely that a high number of rank-and-file do not even necessarily know whom they will stick with, as it is often a coincidence and depends on who is posted where at the moment of the split. This was very much the case when the CNRD split from the FDLR in 2016. Nonetheless, given the long-standing rumors over internal falling out and an impending clash, some preparations might have been done by commanders on both sides.

In the meantime, populations across Walikale, Masisi, Rutshuru, and Lubero territories are as confused as one can be after having lived under fairly stable, army-like control for years. This period was characterized by the most efficient system of illegal taxation (the infamous “jeton” system) developed by any non-state actor in eastern Congo since the heyday of the FDLR. And its significance should not be underestimated: in a region where shifting control and governance patterns are legion, the NDC–R’s rule in many places represented some sort stability, notwithstanding the violence it brought. Some of the scenarios that may occur over the coming weeks are: (a) the atomization of armed control of the region if the NDC-R effectively breaks down (this will depend on how much Guidon’s presence has been an “integrating” factor for the movement), (b) a stand-off in which both factions contest and fight one another, or (c) a quick annihilation of one wing by the other. In all of these scenarios, neither the FARDC’s reaction (especially that of units that have been close to the NDC-R thus far) nor that of other powerful armed groups have been factored in—most notably the sort of alliance that brought the CMC/FDLR/APCLS coalition together with the FPP-AP, the Mazembe wing that is critical of the NDC-R and formerly allied with the FDLR.

If, in the past month, the fighting between the broader coalition around the NDC-R and that around the CMC and FDLR in Rutshuru and Lubero seemed like a return to the situation that prevailed throughout 2016, the NDC-R split could bring us into uncharted territory in terms of its immediate security implications. Finally, another question is the fate of Guidon Shimiray himself – will he end up being captured and facing military trial like his predecessor Sheka, or will he reinvent himself and his alliances on the ground? Wait and see.

This post was originally published on suluhu.org.

Towns in the Kivus Hit by a Spate of Armed Robberies

Joint patrol by the United Nations Police, Congolese National Police and Congolese Army in Goma on May 20, 2020. Photo Monusco / Kevin Jordan

The decision was not taken lightly. In the month of May 2020, the new coronavirus had been spreading through the DRC for several weeks, and the town of Beni, like the rest of the country, had been placed under a public health emergency outlawing any gatherings of more than 20 people (in French). However, there was a something of greater concern in the eyes of militants of the citizens’ movement, the Struggle for Change (LUCHA). “Drastic steps have been taken to fight this epidemic, yet no cases have been recorded here,” recalls Steward, one of the collective’s members. “However, Beni residents are suffering much more from insecurity, which doesn’t seem to worry anybody,” he recalls.

For years, this town in North Kivu has lived under the menace of armed groups and particularly of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a Ugandan Islamist uprising, which regularly commits abuses against civilians and plagues the region. However, in recent weeks, a new phenomenon has made the already dire situation worse: over the course of the first three weeks of May, at least six armed robberies were committed in the town.

For LUCHA, it had become unbearable. So on May 20, the citizens’ movement wrote to the Beni municipality to inform it of its intention to organize “peaceful demonstrations” to denounce “the upsurge in insecurity and the wave of killings in Beni town.” The protests organized for the following day were severely repressed. One of the protesters, Freddy Marcus Kambale, a 19-year-old schoolboy, was shot by police and 21 of his classmates were arrested. The trial of the police officer suspected of this killing is still ongoing (in French).

Beni is far from being an isolated case. For several weeks, the exasperation of locals living in the large urban centers of the Kivus has been growing in the face of a perceived increase in crime. The police, sometimes suspected of complicity with the criminals, are finding it difficult to contain social unrest. In Butembo, on May 27, taxi drivers also took to the streets. The day before, one of them had been killed by armed men. Once again the protests degenerated: one of the protesters was shot and wounded by the police.

The rise in urban insecurity does not appear to be limited to the Kivus. In Lubumbashi, on May 19, Mgr Jean-Pierre Tafunga warned of the upswing in “indescribable” insecurity (in French). And the same day, National Assembly members of the Defense and Security Commission challenged the Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, Gilbert Kankonde, on the increase in insecurity in the country’s cities (in French). “We have received calls from nearly everywhere in our electoral districts alerting us to this phenomenon,” explained its rapporteur, National Assembly member for Walikale, Juvénal Munubo, to KST. The phenomenon has different names in different towns: “40 voleurs” in Goma, “Kasuku” in Butembo, “Kuluna” in Kinshasa… However, the general trend of a rise in urban violence is clear to see.”

It remains difficult to come up with a precise number for this increase due to an absence of statistics on insecurity in the DRC. The lengthy reply penned by the Vice-Primeand Minister of the Interior to National Assembly members provides no statistics, even though it acknowledges the issue.

Data collected by KST nevertheless appears to confirm this trend: an increase in the number of armed robberies was recorded from April in the towns of the Kivus (Beni, Butembo, Goma, Bukavu, Uvira, and Baraka). Twenty incidents of this kind were recorded in April and 24 in May, compared with a monthly average of 11.7. This is unprecedented since March 2018.

The town of Butembo was particularly impacted with 11 such incidents in May (compared with 1.7 in average). This is unprecedented since KST began logging such data in June 2017.

Why is there such a rise? According to Juvénal Munubo, the public health crisis COVID-19, the steps taken to contain it, and the economic crisis are all possible obvious candidates.

Elsewhere in the world, however, isolation measures have inversely caused crime to drop. But it is possible that the consequences of the pandemic are different in the DRC. Except for rare exceptions, such as the Gombe neighborhood in Kinshasa, and the Ibanda neighborhood in Bukavu, residents of Congolese towns have not been ordered to observe strict self-confinement. Most criminals have therefore been free to roam towns, like the rest of the population.

The economic crisis on the other hand has not left DRC cities unscathed and could partly explain this upswing in robberies. On international markets, the Congolese franc has lost approximately 11% of its value since March, dropping from 1700 francs for one dollar to nearly 1900 today, eating into the purchasing power of the Congolese paid in national currency.

In Kinshasa, deadly clashes took place between the police and protesters calling for the reopening of the large market located in the town of Gombe, where food is available at affordable prices (in French). In total, the Central Bank of Congo has revised its 2020 economic forecasts downwards to -2.4% (against -1.9% previously) and now estimates inflation at 9% against the planned 7% (in French). According to the Central Bank, the crisis is essentially due to the “both internal and external population isolation measures.”

Since March, towns in the Kivus have been particularly impacted by border closures with three neighboring countries (Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi) with which traditionally there is intensive trade.

Traffic between the towns of North Kivu (Goma, Butembo, and Beni) was also suspended for three weeks in April, as it was between Goma and Bukavu.

The fact that the town of Butembo, usually a thriving trade hub, has been the most impacted by an upsurge in armed robbery may also point to a link between the slowdown in trade and the increase in urban insecurity.