Can MONUSCO Really Withdraw From the DRC?

A “Short Course on Vehicle Repair” given by the Indian contingent of MONUSCO in Lubero territory. (MONUSCO/Force)

Twenty years. On November 30, it was exactly twenty years to the day that the UN peacekeeping mission in DRC was born. No one, however, had the heart to celebrate this anniversary.

Since November 22, MONUSCO has been facing a popular uprising on a scale rarely seen in North Kivu. On November 25, one of its camps, in Beni’s Boikene neighborhood, was even partly destroyed by protesters. The protesters have accused the mission of inaction – and its most vocal critics of complicity –  during the killing of civilians in recent weeks.

The Kivu Security Tracker (KST) has recorded the deaths of at least 161 civilians by armed groups since November 5 in Beni territory. In the vast majority of cases, these abuses were carried out by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF, a Uganda-based Islamist rebellion), in all likelihood in retaliation for the “major offensive” launched on October 30 by the Congolese army.

During these violent demonstrations, Blue Helmets even opened fire, killing at least one civilian, who, according to the mission, “was about to throw a Molotov cocktail.” An investigation has been opened but this episode has played a part in further radicalizing the protests. They have even reached large towns: demonstrations have been organized by citizen movements such as Lucha in Goma and Kinshasa, calling for the UN mission to leave if it is unable to prevent the killings. In total, KST has logged the deaths of at least 15 people in recent demonstrations in Beni and Butembo.

The confidence of the Congolese in the ability of the mission to ensure their security has, in fact, waned in recent years. In answer to the question “Do you trust MONUSCO to ensure the security of your neighborhood/village?”, only 15% of Congolese polled in December 2018 by Peacebuildingdata.org replied in the affirmative (and only 14% for the inhabitants of North Kivu). This represents a fall of 11 points compared with 2015.

However, the current lack of confidence is occurring at a crucial moment when the future of the mission is under discussion at UN headquarters: its renewed mandate should be adopted before December 20. The mission’s budget, which was for a long time the largest in the world for a peacekeeping mission (it reached 1.45 billion dollars in 2013-2014), has dropped to 1.01 billion dollars, principally due to the reduction in UN funding by the United States. MONUSCO is now less well funded than MINUSMA in Mali or MINUSS in South Sudan.

In March, the Security Council had only renewed the mission in DRC for nine months, not the usual 12. French Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean-Yves le Drian had even announced that this shortened mandate would be used to plan for its “gradual disengagement.”  Meanwhile, a strategic review of the mission has been carried out by Tunisian diplomat Youssef Mahmoud. His report, whose conclusions were leaked to AFP (in French), argues for the mission’s withdrawal within three years.

Could it be that from New York to Beni, a convergence of interests of various kinds of frustration with the mission is leading to its untimely demise?

Some members of the mission are certainly demoralized by their scapegoating. MONUSCO is not responsible for the new wave of violence, as some have stated, particularly since the DRC Armed Forces (FARDC) denied it a role in planning their operations against the ADF.

On December 1, during his visit to eastern Congo, UN Peacekeeping Operations Chief Jean-Pierre Lacroix even stated that the attacks against the mission had been “premeditated, organized and financed” and called for “investigations into everything that has happened.”

Who orchestrated them? On condition of anonymity, some members of the mission revealed to KST that members of the Congolese army took part in fueling the protests against it, including by transporting protesters. KST has been able to verify that certain Congolese army officers have been spreading messages that are hostile to the Blue Helmets.

What was the aim of these officers in seeking to foment hostility against MONUSCO? Focusing criticism on MONUSCO could firstly hide their own responsibility. Also, most of those still in place at the head of the Congolese army were appointed by former President Joseph Kabila, who had called for the withdrawal of MONUSCO before 2020 (in French). Some Congolese officers are themselves under UN sanctions such as General Muhindo Akili Mundos, currently Commander of the 33rd military region (South Kivu and Maniema). According to a high-level UN source, Defense Minister Aimé Ngoy Mukena (who is close to former president Kabila), had still not signed the proposed new cooperation agreement between the FARDC and MONUSCO, even though the former agreement had expired in July.

This would not completely remove any responsibility on MONUSCO’s part. The attacks against civilians could have been anticipated. This armed group had already used this strategy during previous offensives, such as in 2014 (when 345 civilians had been killed in three months). Yet MONUSCO’s mandate defines protecting civilians as one of its two priorities (along with support for Congolese institutions).

Troops engaged on the ground in Beni territory are in reality ill equipped for this mission. In the main, these comprise some 300 Malawian, South African, and Tanzanian soldiers of MONUSCO’s Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), a combat force rather than a civilian protection force. This was created in 2013 to put an end to the M23 rebel movement, which was operating like a regular army. According to several diplomatic sources, it was borne of the will of southern African states to fight against Rwandan influence in the Kivus.

The FIB today must face a completely different enemy, using counter-insurgency techniques. According to the strategic review report, it is also facing “significant problems relating to unified command and control, intelligence, analysis, planning and coordination.”

Its troops have suffered heavy losses in Beni territory in recent years: 15 Blue Helmets were killed in the battle of Semuliki in December 2017. Then, during their last offensive against the ADF, in November 2018, eight Blue Helmets were also killed. Consequently, since then and despite instructions from the mission’s command, FIB patrols, under their own chain of command, with at its head, the South African General Patrick Dube, have become more cautious, including in towns of the Grand Nord of North Kivu.

Compounding this is the fact that the crisis has occurred during a transition at the head of the MONUSCO force: after the departure of its commander, the Brazilian Elias Martins, it found itself without a head. The new deputy commander, General Thierry Lion, who came to his post during the same period, therefore had to take on a dual role. This situation should, however, come to an end shortly: a new force commander, the Brazilian Ricardo Augusto Ferreira Costa Neves, was appointed on December 3.

How can the mission find a way out of this crisis? After the Beni protests, the office of the head of mission, Leila Zerrougui, called for a meeting with the highest Congolese authorities. A meeting of the National Security Council was held on November 25 in Kinshasa with the president of the republic, his ministers and several Congolese generals. It decided to resume “joint operations” between MONUSCO and the FARDC. However, beyond the public announcement, which might have calmed down the protesters, it remains difficult to identify the practical measures that this will involve.

Since then, the UN mission has released information on the support it already provides to the FARDC, mainly in the form of reconnaissance flights and the evacuation of wounded soldiers. It could increase its logistical support to Congolese forces but only to a certain extent: its budget already has a deficit of several million dollars according to the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General.

Joint “planning” meetings between MONUSCO officers and the FARDC were also held (in French) in Beni territory. MONUSCO announced the arrest of combatants as part of joint “combat patrols” with the FARDC (in French). However, its participation in conflicts with the ADF, in the air or on the ground, remains off the table for the time being, according to several diplomatic sources. Several UN officials believe the FARDC operation to be ineffective and badly prepared. They also fear finding themselves mixed up in possible abuses.

In this context, one option could be to suspend operations against the ADF, to provide time to develop a new joint strategy between the FARDC and MONUSCO. Only President Félix Tshisekedi could take such a decision. But it remains to be seen whether Congolese military chiefs would agree. Above all, it would risk appearing as a step backwards in the eyes of the people, and particularly damaging to the president’s image. He had committed to eliminating the ADF before the end of the year.

On a deeper level, there is a profound disconnect between what the Congolese expect of MONUSCO and what MONUSCO is able and willing to do. President Tshisekedi, who wants to keep MONUSCO, is calling for the mission’s military capacity to be reinforced. Among civil society, also, Lucha is calling for MONUSCO “to do something or leave.” Political opponent Martin Fayulu and Nobel Peace Prize winner Denis Mukwege, both of whom are in favor of the UN presence, are calling for military intervention in Beni territory based on the model of the European Artémis operation in 2003 in Ituri province. The underlying idea behind such calls is that a hard-hitting military offensive could quickly eliminate the ADF.

Conversely, several MONUSCO officials asked by KST believe that the mission is “not there to go to war” and that the use of force is only effective if it goes hand in hand with political and diplomatic initiatives. In its report, “The Art of the Possible: MONUSCO’s New Mandate,” the Congo Research Group recommended rebuilding “a viable political strategy for protecting civilians in zones of armed conflict.” Also, the recent independent strategic review indicates that “there is no military solution to many of the security crises in the DRC.” The report also states that “without such a critical re-examination, the mission will continue to be burdened with unrealistic expectations and short term remedies that unwittingly allow Congolese stakeholders to shirk their own responsibility for addressing the causes of conflict many of which are the result of homegrown governance deficits.”

The report even proposes the withdrawal of the FIB, particularly to underscore that “it would also send the signal that neutralization is a sovereign duty of the national army.” In the eventuality that this force is renewed, it should be renewed for no more than one year.

These proposals are now under discussion at the UN Security Council. A withdrawal in less than three years appears unfeasible: even if such a decision were taken, carrying it out would require more time. Moreover, the DRC is still affected by an Ebola epidemic, which risks gaining ground due to recent attacks against MONUSCO and agents of the riposte, such as that at Mangina on November 27.

It is possible, however, that the Security Council will call for this withdrawal to be planned. According to a diplomatic source, the United States, in particular, has expressed its desire for the creation and adoption of a withdrawal timeline.

After the Death of at Least 77 Civilians, the Congolese Army’s Strategy Against the ADF is Called into Question

A Congolese army soldier in North Kivu in 2012. (MONUSCO/Sylvain Liechti)

This blog post was updated on Monday, November 25, 2019, to reflect the killing of 8 more people in Beni, bringing the death count to 77.

“Are we next?” This is the dreaded question that haunts the sleepless nights of the inhabitants of Beni territory. Over the last two weeks, there has almost not been a night without civilian massacres, in the Grand Nord of North Kivu. Ten people killed in Kokola on November 5, 15 in Mbau the following week, 20 in Mavete and Beni on November 19… In all, Kivu Security Tracker (KST) has logged the deaths of 77 civilians in abuses carried out by Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). Over such a short period, such numbers have been unheard of since the wave of killings at the end of 2014, in which 345 people were killed in three months in Beni territory.

All such abuses occurred on the road between Beni town and Eringeti, the most used trunk road in the region. From these towns, you can hear, at a distance, the heavy artillery shelling by the Congolese army of the Uganda-based Islamist rebellion’s positions. However, it is neighbors who are found dead in the early hours of the morning, in most cases killed by stabbing.

According to the Congolese army, however, the “large offensive” launched on October 30 against the ADF has all the hallmarks of success. In announcements largely taken up by Congolese media in the absence of alternative sources, it has reported significant progress in the “triangle of death,” between Eringeti, Mbau and Kamango. If credible, the ADF camps of Vemba, Kadou, Kididiwe, Karwamba, Mabeto, Mayangose, Bahari, Chochota, and Mapobu have been recaptured. 

KST has in fact been able to confirm that some of these have been captured, including Mapobu, one of the rebellion’s main bases (see the above map), in offensives that have cost the lives of 19 Congolese soldiers. Also credible is the death of one of the ADF’s leaders, named “Mzee wa Kazi” by the Congolese army. An analysis of the three different photos of his remains obtained by KST reveals that in reality this is Nasser Abdu Hamid Diiru, Deputy Mwalika Camp Commander

Organigram from the Congo Research Group report “Inside the ADF” of November 2018.

Are such advances the sign of a future military victory? One indicator in particular raises doubt about the effective weakening of the ADF: the number of combatants killed. KST has only been able to confirm the death of 7 ADF combatants. Some photos of the taking of Mapobu show  four additional bodies. The head of operations, General Jacques Nduru Chaligonza (in French), announced on November 8 that his men had killed 25 enemy combatants. However, since then the FARDC has refused to provide a complete list.     

Regardless of the source, the casualties reported by the ADF appear relatively small in number. In their last report, UN experts estimated that this rebellion had between 790 and 1060 soldiers at its disposal, spread over their various camps.

“The enemy is carrying out delaying combat actions: they engage a few combatants every time and seek only to slow down our progress to allow the core of their forces to flee,” admitted a Congolese army officer. 

According to this source, the purpose of the ADF attacks against civilians was to push back the FARDC towards urban areas and to divert it from its objectives. “However, we have understood their strategy,” the source stated. “That’s why we are continuing our advances towards the interior.” The target of the FARDC is the main ADF camp: the “Madina complex.”

Map from the UN Group of Experts on the DRC report of June 2019.

In the eventuality that this base is captured, would it mean the end of the ADF? In previous offensives, such as that of 2014, the FARDC had managed to capture it. However, the territory had not been occupied permanently and the rebels had managed to recapture their strongholds and rebuild their capacity. There is no evidence that things would be different this time. “Our strategy is different,” claimed the Congolese army officer. “Once we have conquered our targets, we’re going to build up our presence and occupy the area.”    

Will the FARDC be able to sustain such an effort in the long term? Some military sources have announced that substantial resources have been implemented, putting forward an unverifiable figure of 22,000 soldiers present on the front. This seems doubtful, however, given the reported casualties. In the past, several FARDC offensives ended due to a lack of funding. It is unclear whether the Congolese state can do better this time, based on public finances. At the end of September, only 3.3 billion dollars had been raised for the state budget, against 4.3 announced at the time (in French). And Kinshasa has other costly priorities, such as the rollout of free primary education (in French).     

In this context, accusations of complicity with the ADF are rife. In the past, authorities in Kinshasa have regularly accused local authorities of collusion with the rebellion. However, in the view of the former minister of Foreign Affairs, Antipas Mbusa Nyamwisi, still influential in the region, the issue lies rather with the Congolese army’s senior commanders. “No offensive will succeed as long as these men, whose misdemeanors have been brought to light many times, are still in place,” he stated to KST. This opponent had aligned himself with President Félix Tshisekedi last May (in French) and called for the appointment of certain officers to operational command against the ADF, without success (in French). He has since distanced himself from the presidency: he indicated that he has not returned to the country since August.   

In any case, the toll in civilian lives has made the operation difficult to sustain in the long term. If there were to be further massacres, Congolese public opinion could cease to support the main offensive announced by Félix Tshisekedi in the east of the country. Sporadic demonstrations have occurred in Beni, Butembo, Oicha, and Kasindi. The citizen movement Lucha, who had assisted the FARDC on November 9 (in French), are now demonstrating to call for security measures in favor of the population, such as in Oicha on November 20. North Kivu deputies, who had called for this operation on November 4 (in French), now describe themselves as “deeply worried” by how the situation is evolving (in French)

“In fact, this operation had not been prepared,” complained one of them. “It was only launched to satisfy the president who had committed to bringing peace in the east of the country. Some military chiefs never really believed in it themselves.”

President Félix Tshisekedi had publicly announced, on October 10, the imminent start of the “last” offensive against the ADF that would “definitively exterminate them.” To do so, he tried to obtain foreign support, notably from Uganda. He even more broadly attempted to constitute a regional coalition against armed groups in the east, with the creation of an integrated Chiefs of Staff in Goma.

These efforts failed in the face of mistrust between Kigali and Kampala: on October 25, Uganda refused to associate itself with this initiative. Félix Tshisekedi did discuss this problem again with Yoweri Museveni on November 9 in Kampala. Officially, the two men agreed “to work together” against “the negative forces which hold sway in the east of the DRC.” “However, we are aware of no indications that, on the ground, Uganda is assisting the FARDC in this operation,” claimed a MONUSCO official.   

The FARDC are therefore alone on the front. Especially since MONUSCO has not joined in the offensive either. It has only provided occasional support in the form of reconnaissance flights and evacuation of the injured (in French) – some twenty FARDC soldiers have been evacuated to date, according to a UN source.

MONUSCO has also had difficulty in carrying out its mission to protect the civilian population, one of the two main priorities of its mandate (in French). “We’re trying to establish 24/7 patrols, as well as roadblocks to filter movements of people,” explained one of the officials. “But it’s very difficult to monitor individuals who move at night with cold weapons. It even seems that the ADF are using networks already established in towns.”   

The Islamist rebellion has in fact been present in the region since 1995 and has developed strong ties with some local communities. And in turn it seems to have carefully prepared for the FARDC offensive. In September and October, KST observed an upswing in ADF attacks against FARDC positions, with the possible aim of intimidating them and recovering their weapons.

“We have also noticed movements towards Tshabi in the province of Ituri, which would suggest that the ADF have put their wives and children out of harm’s way,” added a UN source. During some of their attacks, the rebels have also targeted specific communities, such as the pygmies, whose members are sometimes employed as trackers for the Congolese army. A prominent family in Oicha was also massacred.

At this price, the Congolese army will perhaps be able to conquer the last ADF strongholds. Maybe this is its objective. It would allow those in power to show some results. A complete victory over the ADF, on the other hand, seems doubtful without a change of strategy.

Foreign Troops Enter DRC: Why the Goma Meeting Failed

Representatives of the region’s armies at the first Goma meeting on September 13 and 14 (DR/Jonathan Kombi for actualite.cd)

This blog post was updated on Friday, November 15, 2019, to reflect the results of the meeting held between Félix Tshisekedi and Yoweri Museveni on November 9.

Uganda will not be taking part in a new venture in neighboring countries in the Eastern DR Congo. At least, not now and not in the form initially planned. 

On October 24 and 25 in Goma, a highly anticipated meeting was supposed to have led to the creation of an “integrated Chief of Staff” of the region’s armies (Burundi, DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania) which could have paved the way for these countries’ soldiers to take part in operations against armed groups in eastern DRC. The meeting in question did take place, in the presence of the Chief of Staff of the Congolese army Célestin Mbala, the Chief of the Ugandan army Peter Elwelu, the Chief of Rwandan military intelligence Vincent Nyakarundi, MONUSCO observers (led by the French Brigadier General Thierry Lion, the blue helmets’ deputy commander in DRC), and representatives of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM).    

However, the Ugandan delegation refused to sign the final declaration. According to several military and diplomatic sources, including one present at the meeting, this refusal was only made known on the second and final day of the meeting. Uganda had not expressed any reservations until then, nor at the previous meeting held in Goma on September 13 and 14 (in French), nor on the first day, October 25. This radical shift suggests a counter order was issued from Kampala, which has had particularly tense relations with Rwanda for months.  

According to a Congolese military source present at the meeting, and several sources close to the Ugandan army, Kampala now wishes to take part in the search for Allied Democratic Forces (ADF, a Ugandan rebel Islamist group, present in the Congo) within the framework of a bilateral agreement and is against any kind of regional agreement. 

Uganda specifically wanted to avoid a deal that would have allowed the Rwandan army to be legally present on Congolese soil, including in the south of South Kivu and in the Grand Nord of North Kivu, according to a source familiar with the matter. 

“Uganda appears to have realized that Rwanda would have the most to win from this coalition,” explained a diplomatic source. “Kigali would have gained a semblance of legality to justify the presence of its troops in eastern Congo and extended its sphere of influence.” 

According to a source familiar with the matter, Uganda was also extremely annoyed by the discreet arrival of Rwandan troops in eastern Congo in recent months. Their arrival had been reported to Kivu Security Tracker (KST) by several sources from civil society, the army and local Congolese authorities, and was not disputed by Rwandan and Congolese military sources when asked. 

However, Uganda was not alone in opposing the regional coalition. The Common Front for Congo (FCC), a coalition led by Joseph Kabila, with a majority in parliament, has expressed “reservations” about “foreign troops entering onto Congolese soil,” believing that it “would lead to a settling of scores between the troops, given their proven belligerence [and that] the collateral victims would inevitably be the populations in the east of the country” (in French). 

In recent weeks, civil society in eastern Congo has also voiced opposition to any presence of foreign troops on its soil (in French). Parliamentarians such as UNC (Union for the Congolese Nation, a member of the ruling coalition) deputy Juvénal Munubo and senator Jean-Philippe Mabaya (opposition party) have also called on the executive to answer oral questions with debate on the issue, which seems to have embarrassed the government: no response has been provided on this matter, nor has any official announcement been made to national representatives on the ongoing negotiations. For Tshisekedi, whose slogan is “the people first,” supporting this project in the face of such popular hostility would have undoubtedly proven difficult.   

Has the creation of this integrated Chief of Staff been definitively abandoned? Not altogether.

Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi and his Ugandan counterpart, Yoweri Museveni, discussed the matter of “security in the sub-region” during their meeting in Entebbe on Saturday, November 9.

According to the statement issued after the meeting, the two presidents have decided to work together, “including with other countries” to “combat the negative forces that [continue to] afflict the eastern part of DRC.”

According to Congolese and Rwandan military sources, the region’s armies have agreed to convene another meeting in a month’s time, with the date yet to be determined.

Uganda appears to have the power to make its conditions on collaboration be heard. President Félix Tshisekedi jeopardized his credibility by publicly committing, during a speech in Beni, to restoring peace before the end of the year (in French). Yet the “last offensive” against the group, launched with great fanfare on October 30 by the Congolese army alone (it failed to even receive the support of MONUSCO), seems to have already suffered from setbacks. During the night between November 5 and 6, at least ten civilians and six Congolese soldiers were killed in the village of Kokola, between Oicha and Eringeti, in an ADF attack verified by KST. 

“The Congolese army suffers from structural weaknesses which mean that without additional resources success is unlikely,” claims a former MONUSCO official. “It lacks well trained special forces and intelligence forces. And the situation is even worse when it comes to aviation. It lost two of its three Mi24 attack helicopters in the mountains of Virunga in 2017 and therefore no longer has any capacity in this area. As for MONUSCO air support, it is not enough. That is why the intervention of Ugandan aviation and special forces, planned for in the framework of the coalition, makes sense.”     

Félix Tshisekedi, who has to accommodate the reluctance of Congolese public opinion and that of his allies in the FCC, prevailing conditions in neighboring countries and the weaknesses of his army, has very limited room for maneuver to restore peace in the east of the country.

Atrocities, Populations Under Siege, Regional Tensions: What is Happening in Minembwe?

A MONUSCO delegation in Fizi, one of the territories affected by recent violences, March 16 2019 (MONUSCO/Jacob de Lange)

“Genocide.” That terrible word, which reverberates louder in the Great Lakes region than elsewhere was once again voiced, on October 16, like a stone cast into rough waters. This is how representatives of the Banyamulenge described the situation in the highlands of South Kivu in a press release. This community of Rwandaphone Tutsi cattle breeders claims it is being targeted by an extermination plan, led by the Mai-Mai Ebu-Ela, Aochi, Mulumba and Biloze-Bishambuke groups, allied with Burundi rebel groups. Is this really the situation? “There is no genocide,” countered a MONUSCO source. “However, there has been some ethnic cleansing of the Banyamulenge and other communities who live in the Minembwe region.”

Since the beginning of the year, Kivu Security Tracker (KST) has documented 26 violent incidents carried out by armed groups in the area. Twelve were carried out by Mai-Mai groups, two by the Burundi rebel National Forces of Liberation (FNL), and twelve by armed Banyamulenge groups (Ngumino and Twiganeho).

Nearly all of the Banyamulenge still present in the area have now gathered in Minembwe center, a village deserted by all other communities. There are said to be some 25,000 displaced civilians in this location alone, according to its deputy mayor (in French). “We’ve lost more than 100 people and over 35000 cows, the product of many generations’ labor,” stated a community leader.

What started this cycle of violence? It is difficult to pinpoint due to its long history. The Banyamulenge are a community of cattle breeders, from Burundi and Rwanda, and arrived with their herds of cows in the South Kivu highlands in the 19th Century. The Belgian colonial power however never created a “chieftaincy” for this semi-nomadic group, in contrast to the neighboring communities of Babembe, Bafuliru, and Bayindu farmers.

After independence, they were the target of ethnic hatred and discrimination. Yet some Banyamulenge took part in these abuses, often for purposes of self-defense. The rejection of this community increased considerably during the First and Second Congo Wars, when some of its members occupied important military and civilian positions in the violent and deeply unpopular South Kivu rebellions of the AFDL (1996-1997) and the RCD (1998-2003). After the end of the war, most Banyamulenge rebels joined the Congolese army. However, some small groups remained in the highlands, particularly the Federalist Republican Forces (FRF), claiming their community needed protection. To a certain extent, this was a self-fulfilling prophecy: their presence was later used to justify the mobilization of Mai-Mai groups.     

For researcher Judith Verweijen of the University of Sheffield, the recent cycle of violence is the end product of a process that started “at least four years ago.” “It began with disputes over customary power in the Bijombo area and the increasing influence of the Banyamulenge Ngumino armed group (“let’s stay here” in Kinyamulenge). Possibly overestimating its strength, it started brutally taxing the local population. This accelerated the recruitment of self-defense groups in the area and led to a first wave of clashes in 2015 and 2016.” 

This already tense context was made worse by growing regional tensions. After the highly controversial candidacy of Burundi President Pierre Nkurunziza for a third term in 2015, Burundi rebellions in the Congo saw an influx of new combatants, including the FNL and the Resistance for the Rule of Law in Burundi (RED-Tabara), in particular. The latter were supported by Rwanda from 2015, mostly in terms of recruitment and training, according to a UN group of experts.

However, this area soon became the base of another rebellion, this time hostile to Rwanda: the Rwanda National Congress (RNC) of dissident Kayumba Nyamwasa, exiled in South Africa. According to another UN group of experts report on DR Congo, he is based in the Bijabo forest, north of Minembwe, and has allied himself with Banyamulenge Ngumino combatants. The same report states that Burundi is also being used as a place of transit for some recruits.

Into this explosive cocktail, a spark was thrown: on February 21, 2019, Gady Mukiza, a Munyamulenge, became mayor of the newly created rural municipality (commune rurale) of Minembwe. The identity of the Minister of Decentralization and Institutional Reforms, overseeing such reforms, Azarias Ruberwa, also a Munyamulenge, contributed to increasing mistrust among neighboring community members. For these communities’ representatives, who often deny that Banyamulenge possess Congolese nationality and are opposed to their participation in local government, this was viewed as provocation. This was rapidly aggravated by a wave of violence committed by the Ngumino (see graph below).

Number of civilians killed in attacks by the Ngumino armed group

A coalition composed of local Mai-Mai militia, backed by the Burundi FNL and RED-Tabara rebellions, joined together to fight against them in March, according to Munyamulenge deputy Moïse Nyarugabo. According to two local sources (one from civil society and the other military), this coalition is reported to be supported by members of the Rwandan Special Forces, notably via their RED-Tabara allies. For Kigali, which has been in conflict with some Banyamulenge leaders for many years, taking part in this operation also had the benefit of depriving the RNC of a rear base.

Two events documented by KST will certainly contribute to heightening the emerging cycle of violence. On May 4, 2019, the Ngumino assassinated Banyindu customary chief Kawaza Nyakwana. This led to an upsurge in atrocities, in particular with the burning of villages, lasting until the month of June. Then, on September 7, Ngumino chief Semahurungure was assassinated in Tulambo village, several kilometers from the front line. 

According to the above-mentioned local sources, as well as Congolese and Rwandan military sources, this operation was reportedly organized with Kigali’s backing, at least in terms of intelligence. A MONUSCO intelligence source questioned by KST was unable to confirm this operation but was surprised by the assassination which was “considerably different to usual Mai-Mai operational practices”, and which bore a “strange” similarity to the assassination, equally perplexing, of the head of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, Sylvestre Mudacumura.   

In any case, today the Ngumino appear weakened. The core Banyamulenge armed groups which are still active are the Twiganeho (“let’s defend ourselves” in Kinyamulenge), “self-defense” militia groups which traditionally mobilize when the community is threatened. 

Since the latest violent episodes, MONUSCO has established two temporary bases in Minembwe. However, a Munyamulenge dignitary remains worried that “it’s already too late and that the current crisis will have irreversible consequences for the peaceful coexistence of communities in the area.” 

Should neighboring countries’ armies be invited into Eastern DR Congo?

Ugandan soldiers during U.S. Army training in June 2019 (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Amy Picard / )

It’s a five-page document that has gained a lot of attention. On October 13, military analyst (and advisor to opponent Moïse Katumbi), Jean-Jacques Wondo, published a document to his twitter account signed by the Chief of Staff of the Congolese army, Célestin Mbala. It reveals plans for a major joint offensive with the region’s armies against the insurgencies in eastern DR Congo from November to May next year.

According to the document, the armies of Burundi, Uganda, Rwanda, and Tanzania have been asked to send a contingent of special forces to join the integrated Chief of Staff HQ in Goma. 

This is a particularly sensitive matter given the long and painful history of the presence of foreign armies in Congo. One of the most traumatic episodes was the multiple clashes between Ugandan and Rwanda forces in Kisangani, in 1999 and 2000, which claimed hundreds of Congolese civilian lives. In 2009, the involvement of Rwandan forces in the context of the operation dubbed “Umoja Wetu” (“Our Unity”) sparked a political crisis that led to the resignation of the president of the national assembly, Vital Kamerhe – he is currently chief of staff to President Félix Tshisekedi.

Despite no official confirmation, it is highly likely an authentic document. None of the sources contacted for this article (including two military and two presidential sources) have issued denials. Also, two of them have confirmed the meeting announced in the document: that of the region’s army chiefs of staff from October 24-25 in Goma.

However, at this time, this only seems to be a working document destined to change, according to a military source quoted by RFI (in French). Some of the details in the document have already been refuted by the parties involved. MONUSCO officers, for example, would not be part of an integrated chief of staff HQ, contrary to what is stated in the document. “Legally and technically, our mandate is strictly national and does not allow for supporting a regional coalition,” explained Florence Marchal, spokesperson for the head of MONUSCO, Leïla Zerrougui, to the Kivu Security Tracker (KST). “This mandate runs until December and only the Security Council can amend it.” A diplomatic source also indicated that the presence of American officials had not been formally acknowledged, contrary to what is suggested in the document. Lastly, two Congolese presidential sources have stated that an offensive by the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) alone, led by General Fall Sikabwe, is planned to be launched soon. One of these sources did, however, recognize that discussions on creating a regional force were ongoing, even if its framework remained unclear: it has not discarded the idea, in particular, of the MONUSCO Intervention Brigade providing for troops from new neighboring countries. 

In any case, the Congolese desire to build a regional coalition is real and is close to President Félix Tshisekedi’s heart. Following a first meeting between the chiefs of staff of Burundi, DR Congo, Uganda, and Rwanda in Goma on September 13 and 14, the Congolese president, speaking at the UN, called for “the creation of a regional coalition similar to the global coalition against terrorism, to stamp out the plague of insecurity created by domestic or foreign armed groups.”    

Will this project be successful? At first glance, it is appealing. Some of the most active armed groups in eastern DR Congo, such as the Ugandan rebel Islamist Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) or the Resistance for the Rule of Law in Burundi (RED-Tabara), are of foreign origin. Additionally, Gitega, Kampala, and Kigali are all frequently suspected of aiding some armed groups in Kivu, and by doing so waging a proxy war. Enhanced cooperation between all countries of the region is therefore clearly one of the key conditions for putting an end to the violence.

It remains uncertain however that now is the right time for such harmonization. Rwanda and Uganda have been at crisis point since February, and there are no signs that this will improve. After Rwanda suffered a violent incursion from Congo on October 4, some of the arrested rebels were brought before the press where they stated that they had been recruited in Uganda (in French).     

According to the Butembo national deputy, Muhingo Nzangi, this unprecedented coalition is more dictated by mistrust between the region’s countries than by a genuine desire to work together. “The initial idea was that our army form a coalition with Ugandan forces to put an end to the ADF, as unfortunately it cannot do it alone,” he stated. “I wrote to the president to support that idea. Tshisekedi and Museveni agreed. But Rwanda believed it couldn’t leave Ugandan forces in DR Congo unsupervised. President Tshisekedi therefore accepted that they also take part in the operation, which I regret. Lastly, to appease Burundi, which is wary of Rwanda, it was also asked to join.” In all cases, it is far from clear that all participants are particularly willing. The leaked document was originally part of some correspondence from Congolese General Célestin Mbala to his counterpart in Burundi.      

Despite this climate of suspicion, the plan provides for Rwandan and Ugandan officers to share the same operational sectors of North Kivu. And in northern South Kivu, Burundian and Rwandan troops are to share operations. The worst-case scenario – a direct clash on Congolese soil between foreign armies – is therefore not implausible.   

The arrival of these armies which have in the past committed many abuses in DR Congo could also elicit feelings of humiliation in the population and cause adverse effects, such as spurring Congolese “self-defense” groups present in the country. This phenomenon was observed following the “Umoja Wetu” joint Rwandan-Congolese operation against the FDLR at the start of 2009.

Furthermore, a majority of the “national” armed groups are included among the targets of the joint operation. “Faced with foreign armies, the Mai-Mai will immediately form a coalition,” Nzangi fears. “And if there are clashes between them and these forces, there’s a serious risk that things will go very badly.”

The meeting planned in Goma from October 24-25 to better define the outlines of the coalition will be crucial.

Laying down arms one day to take them up again the next: why the disarmament of rebels is at a standstill

Former Rwandan combatants voluntarily surrendering at Kamina Camp in 2002. (UN Photo/Yasmina Bouziane)

“Our fight will be to bring you peace. A definitive peace, a peace necessary for the stability of our country. And [for] that peace, believe me, I’m willing to die.” In Bukavu on Monday October 7, Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi made an ambitious commitment.   

His election, it is true, provoked a wave of armed groups surrendering and the hope that peace would finally return to the Kivus. However, in Kalehe territory, some twenty kilometers away, local residents are unsure as to whether this is the best way forward. A few days before the president’s speech, the process almost seemed to be in reverse: Butachibera, the head of a Raia Mutomboki militia, who had recently surrendered to the Congolese army, decided in the end to return to the bush to take up arms again.

In this case, as in many others, the main reason for the failure of demobilization appears to be the lack of preparedness by Congolese authorities. “In reception centers, militia members who have gone there have no access to mattresses, beverages, not even food,” complained a Congolese army officer on duty in the area. We have to ask the local population for help. If we had the capacity to accommodate them, all armed groups would have already surrendered!” 

The failed surrender of Butachibera is far from an isolated case. Last March, Ngubito, the head of the Raia Mutomboki Kabishula, surrendered with 400 men before returning to the forest. “Colonel” Mayani, of the Union des patriotes pour la libération du Congo (UPLC), had also laid down arms but most of his 500 men went into hiding at the end of September. In Fizi territory, in South Kivu in February, hundreds of combatants from the Mai-Mai Reunion group also took up arms again after having been stationed nearby. In March, it was the Congolese army that attacked the men of Mai-Mai “General” Ebu Ela, who were regrouping precisely in order to surrender. Since then they have gone into hiding and are taking part in the community-based conflict ravaging the Minembwe area. A similar scenario occurred in Kasai in February: in Kamako, the poorly organized surrender of a group of Kamuina Nsapu militia members ended in shooting, and the deaths of 19 of these militia members at the hands of the Congolese army, as indicated in a report by the Congo Research Group (CRG). The upshot of this: their brothers-in-arms have since taken up arms again.

The issue of adequately providing for ex-combatants is not new. In 2014, Human Rights Watch (HRW) revealed that 100 demobilized former combatants or members of their family had died of hunger and disease due to failings on the part of the Congolese government. In 2015, a budget of 85 million dollars was approved for the Implementation Unit of the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program (UEPNDDR). However, it never received any funds.

Failing any genuine change in this area, there are credible fears that the wave of surrenders initiated by the election of Felix Tshisekedi will come to nothing and that an historic opportunity will have been wasted.

The president however did ask in February that the head of MONUSCO, Leila Zerrougui, provide him with assistance on this dossier. But setting up the program took several months. According to a MONUSCO official, its implementation was reported to have suffered from disagreement within the UN mission. “Some of us wanted the government to start by putting its multiple structures in charge of this dossier in order: the UEPNDDR was not restarted by Tshisekedi’s team. There is also a unit is in charge of this in the army. And Tshisekedi has asked his advisor Claude Ibalanky to deal with these issues: he has appointed him as coordinator of the National Oversight Mechanism of the Addis Ababa Agreement. Others believed that we should launch an ad hoc program as soon as possible.”      

“There have been delays, it’s true, but it’s not MONUSCO’s fault”, claims Florence Marchal, Head of Mission Leila Zerrougui’s spokesperson. 

Whatever the case, this program is finally being rolled out. Following the meeting between Felix Tshisekedi and the provincial governors of Ituri, Maniema, North and South Kivu, and Tanganyika in Bukavu on October 9, the President confirmed that a “clear DDR plan should be submitted as soon as possible.” The UN Peacebuilding Fund released a first installment of 6 million dollars to finance it on Friday October 4. However, these funds are only for the demobilization of militia in the Kasais and Tanganyika. “In these provinces, the situation is simpler than in the the Kivus,” explained Florence Marchal. “Firstly, all the armed groups based there are national. Secondly, they generally don’t have any political demands. Our position on this issue is no impunity – those that surrender and have committed abuses should face justice – and reintegration back into civilian life, not in the armed forces.”

As things stand, previous waves of demobilization and reintegration in the Kivus have only met with limited success and are regularly accused of inciting the creation of rebel groups that profit from these programs. “We’re surely not going to give them money for arms, which by the way they only ever hand over in dribs and drabs,” railed another UN source some months ago, in the heat of internal discussions.

Nonetheless, as far as the armed groups in the Kivus are concerned, there are no plans to implement any programs. By default, the main option for them appears to be military defeat. At the UN General Assembly, Felix Tshisekedi advocated for MONUSCO, but for a mission that is “nimble, well equipped, strong, and with a properly adjusted mandate, similar to the Rapid Intervention Brigade, which once defeated the M23 Movement.” In Beni, on October 10, he announced a final attack against the islamist insurgency of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). And he had admitted to “information sharing” with neighboring countries that wished to stamp out hostile insurgencies in DRC.   

The commander of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), Sylvestre Mudacumura, was killed on September 18, in an operation in which Rwandan special forces took part. However, the effectiveness of this type of targeted operation is questionable. The death of the head of an armed group can sometimes deprive negotiators of an interlocutor, and jeopardize the chances of troops surrendering. The death of Mudacumura, however, did not protect Rwanda from the deadliest cross-border attack originating from DRC in recent years on October 4. In any case, approximately 130 armed groups are operating solely within the Kivu region, which suggests a systemic problem. It remains highly unlikely that arms alone can provide a solution.    

“For Ms. Zerrougui, there cannot be a purely military solution,”stated Florence Marchal. “The aim of these operations can only be to foster political dialogue and attack the root causes of conflicts.” In New York, where she was based at the end of September, the head of MONUSCO stepped up advocacy in front of the World Bank and donor countries that traditionally support DRC to finally pave the way for more ambitious demobilization programs.   

“There is a clear expression of support for such efforts on their part,” stated Florence Marchal. “These 6 million dollars are important because they allow for a quick start and encourage other donors. But this sum is only a small fraction of the amount that we want to raise.” When such new programs are finally rolled out, will the Kivu rebel groups still be willing to put down their arms?

[Guest blog] General Mudacumura: the death of a most-wanted

Christoph Vogel is a researcher and investigator specialising on DRC’s armed groups. A former member of the UN security council group of experts, he currently works with the Conflict research programme based at London school of economics and Ghent University (Belgium).

This morning, around 5am, the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda’s (FDLR) long-standing overall military commander Lt.-Gen. Sylvestre Mudacumura (also known by his noms de guerre Bernard Mupenzi and Pharaon) has been killed in a raid near Bwito-Monument, a small locality in southern Bwito chieftaincy roughly situated between Bukombo and Bambu.

Mudacumura has been one of the most-wanted armed group leaders and war criminals in the past 25 years. Indicted by the International Criminal Court for crimes committed by the FDLR and its predecessors (ALiR I/II, RDR, ex-FAR/interahamwe) in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mudacumura was also one of the few known Rwandan génocidaires still at large. Born in today’s Rubavu area of Rwanda in 1954, the young Mudacumura made a fulminant military career in the Rwanda of the 1980s. Interrupted by military training in Germany specialising on transmissions (journalist Simone Schlindwein, in her book, recounts how much later he would still greet his troops in German), Mudacumura made it into former Rwandan president Habyarimana’s presidential guard, temporarily serving as a personal bodyguard. During the 1994 genocide, Mudacumura is suspected to have played a commanding role in several killing operations.

As the RPF was progressing and pushing back the then-Rwandan army and the interahamwe, he managed to flee and cross the border into then-Zaire. Ever since, he has risen the ranks of the Rwandan rebel groups formed out of the génocidaires, effectively becoming the military commander of the FDLR in the mid-2000s, as his predecessor Paul Rwarakabije demobilized and returned to Rwanda. A few years later, in 2009, joint Rwando-Congolese military operations dubbed Umoja Wetu inflicted serious losses to the group which hitherto controlled vast parts of eastern Congo’s Kivu provinces. In 2012, the ICC issued an international arrest warrant against Mudacumura. He also figures – alongside 8 other key genocide suspects – on a US-issued most-wanted list. On the ground, this coincided roughly with a further blow to the FDLR, as the nascent Raia Mutomboki militia in Walikale, Shabunda and Kalehe areas were able to further weaken the Rwandan group. Ever since, the FDLR has been mainly based out of northern Masisi and western Rutshuru areas, including with key strongholds in the Virunga National Park.

While the FDLR has been feared for large-scale massacres throughout most of the 2000s, the group changed strategy in the face of growing military pressure. In the current decade, it has mainly tried to stand away from military confrontation and limit attacks and human rights abuses so as to diminish international justice and media interest, but also to avoid further losses in effectives and ammunition. Economically, the FDLR has lost most of its mining operations throughout Umoja Wetu and the subsequent Raia Mutomboki mobilisation. Ever since, it has focused revenue generation on a fine-grained system they internally refer to as ‘logistique non-conventionelle’ (LNC). It includes legal business such as agriculture, herding and local retail trade as well as systems of forced taxation, trade in cannabis, charcoal and woods – often in collaboration with Congolese armed groups, army units and local traders. LNC has permitted the FDLR to maintain purchases of ammunition in an era of shrinking revenue and as outside support (such as through diaspora organisations) has become more difficult due to scrutiny over financial transactions. However, increasing economic pressure also led the FDLR to carry out kidnappings, mostly notably in mid-2018, when their abduction of two British tourists led to the temporary closure of Virunga National Park. By the mid 2010’s, the FDLR possibly had around 2000-3000 combatants, more weapons than soldiers in many of its units but severely lacked supply in ammunition which they would mostly gather in small quantities from individual Congolese army officers.

In the past couple of years, the FDLR’s position kept weakening for a couple of converging reasons. After the demise of the M23 rebellion, Kinshasa, regional governments and the UN agreed on putting the FDLR top of the list of armed groups that needed to be forcefully disarmed for the sake of local and regional stabilisation. Yet, UN-backed operations of the Congolese army (FARDC) began against the Ugandan-originating ADF in Beni area and subsequently planned FDLR operations fell apart in a row between UN peacekeeping forces and the FARDC. Nonetheless, the Congolese army began unilateral operations in late 2014, known as Sukola II. In parallel, newly emerging Congolese armed groups – in particular a splinter faction of Sheka Ntabo Ntaberi led by Guidon Shimiray as well as the various Mazembe militia in Lubero area – began tracking down FDLR units on their side. Having lost key headquarters in Mumo and Ihula by 2016, the FDLR kept control over parts of northern Masisi and western Rutshuru. At this point, deeply entrenched internal divisions – reflecting both the regionalist split between northern and southern Rwandans in the leadership as well as diverging attitudes to repatriation of civilian Rwandan refugees which the FDLR claims to represent – led to a major split (previous defections had happened in the 2000s, prompting the FDLR-Soki and the RUD-Uranana factions) and the creation of the CNRD, which took the whole of the FDLR’s Mwenga-based South Kivu wing and significant parts of its North Kivu wing, especially those based out of Masisi.

Ever since, the FDLR and its armed wing FOCA (Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi) became limited to a triangle between Nyanzale, Kitchanga and Rutshuru town. Mostly situated inside Virunga National Park, this area had been a home turf to the group for many years – helping the FDLR’s hide-and-run strategy when facing military pressure. Several operations to catch Mudacumura or other senior leaders between 2014 and 2018 failed due to the FDLR’s superior knowledge of the terrain but also in sequence to leaks out of the Congolese army and the UN. Bolstering their stamina in western and southern Rutshuru, the FDLR also tied an efficient web of Congolese Hutu militia – often collectively referred to as Nyatura (‘hit hard’/’hard sticks’) – especially the CMC coalition including Dominique Ndaruhutse and the late John Love. Using its infrastructure (especially what remains from the FDLR’s training wing called ‘Groupement des Ecoles’), the FDLR formed hundreds of Nyatura recruits who in turn would form a cordon sanitaire around the FDLR’s positions and taking the bulk of fighting against FARDC, NDC–R, Mazembe and other enemy forces. Yet, pressure on the FDLR/CMC alliance mounted in 2017 and 2018 as Guidon Shimiray’s NDC–R flamboyantly progressed to take control over most of southern Lubero and eastern Walikale. In early 2019, the NDC–R further expanded into northern Masisi, dislodging first the FDLR’s former CNRD brothers-in-arms as well as the Nyatura groups of Kavumbi, Jean-Marie and Nzayi (part of which were incorporated into Guidon’s troops). Throughout the Sukola II era, the FARDC focused increasingly on capturing individual FDLR top brass (including Vainqueur, Mudacumura’s former personal guard chief, intelligence chief Sophonie Mucebo, General Leopold Mujyambere or most recently the FDLR’s spokesperson Laforge Fils Bazeye). With the FDLR cut in half and under strong pressure since 2016, these losses have further weakened the organisational and military capacity of the group, whose only serious combat force to date is the Maccabe unit composed of its special forces. Occasional joint operations between Congolese and Rwandan army units have happened as well, but were mostly not officially declared – such as most recently throughout the first half of 2019 in Rutshuru area.

Throughout the past months, clashes circled in around Kitchanga and Mweso, two major towns located just west of the FDLR’s and CMC’s strongholds. Finally, just two days ago, a major NDC–R troop movement was reported from Mweso/Kashuga area (Masisi) into Bukombo (Rutshuru). At the same time, other movements were reported into Bukombo area from units wearing FARDC uniforms. Today at 5am, Mudacumura was killed in Bwito-Monument. The event took place in presence of several other high-ranking FDLR commanders, two of which have been killed according to FARDC sources, while others may be on the run as combats have continued throughout the zone during the day. Media and observers have been in disagreement over whom has taken out Mudacumura. While some point at Guidon’s NDC–R, others have mentioned FARDC commando troops in a joint operation with Rwandan special forces. Given that the area is highly inaccessible, early affirmation are to be taken with a pinch of salt. Looking at historical operational dynamics in the area, however, it would not be surprising if all of this is true to a certain extent and various belligerents be involved either directly or indirectly in Mudacumura’s killing. It is not known, however, whether Mudacumura has been killed because he resisted arrest or whether this was the actual objective of the raid.

A couple of points are particularly striking: in dozens of attempts, this is the first successful not only in getting to Mudacumura but actually eliminating him. Secondly, if it weren’t for official confirmation and a few well-placed local sources, it may be impossible to authenticate Mudacumura’s killing – pictures used for his arrest warrant are all 20+ years old and he has been particularly successful not only in escaping arrest but also in camouflaging himself and his whereabouts. Third, he was wearing a Rwandan army uniform while killed, indicating that in its last unsuccessful raids into Rwanda, FDLR special forces may at least have pillaged a small army warehouse. Fourth, UN troops seem not to be involved in the operation.

In sum, whoever of all potentially participating forces carried out the actual killing, this represents another major blow to the FDLR. While subsequent military operations and pressure from Congolese armed groups have diminished the FDLR in size, territory and capabilities, the loss of key leaders – including convicted Ignace Murwanashyaka who died in a German prison earlier in 2019 – is not to be underestimated considering the group’s emphasis on bureaucratic and hierarchical structures (even after 20+ years based in Congolese forest, the FDLR keeps meticulous records on stockpiles, units, activities and internal commands). Mudacumura has been, until the end and despite his advanced age, the groups undisputed military leader even as younger commanders such as Pacifique Ntawunguka or Gaby Ruhinda had become more relevant in operational military affairs. Moreover, he has been a key ideological pillar inside the group, especially after the CNRD split that left the FDLR increasingly dominated by Mudacumura and interim president Victor Byiringiro.

Whether or not this is the end of the FDLR is difficult to tell. Relying on internal cohesion and ideology, the group has often managed to rebound and survive after previous blows. However, the loss of its evergreen leader certainly is a big piece to chew for the remaining leadership. Moreover, it is unlikely that self-declared FDLR enemies such as the NDC–R will suddenly stop their military campaign. On the other hand, the FDLR’s and CMC’s entrenched versatility in southern Bwito could also lead to a lengthy and protracted stand-off in the coming months.

Movements of Rwandan rebels in South Kivu raise fears

In recent months, combatants from the National Council for Renewal and Democracy (CNRD), a dissident wing of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) rebellion, and their dependents have migrated in large numbers to the Kalehe highlands in South Kivu province. The Kivu Security Tracker (KST) has spoken to numerous sources – members of civil society, three Congolese army officers and a UN official – who speak of some 5,000 people, including men and women, and even children who have arrived in two waves.

The first group came between the end of December 2018 and January 2019. Pursued in North Kivu by the Nduma defense of Congo-Renovated (NDC-R), led by Guidon Shimiray Mwissa, they fled to South Kivu from Masisi, Rutshuru and Walikale territories. They headed to the high altitude forests overlooking Lake Kivu, where Tutsi and Hutu communities have been settled for decades. Then, around the end of April, a second group of CNRD left from Fizi, Uvira and Mwenga territories, crossing through Walungu and Kabare territories to Kalehe. They mixed in with the native Rwandophone population in the villages of Zirhalo, Numbi, Shange, Lumbishi and Kavumu, according to the same local sources, building makeshift shelters, farming fields and taxing local mining sites. Since then, the two groups appear to have merged and moved slightly northward toward the Masisi-Kalehe border.

Wilson Irategeka, President of the CNRD

Their presence, confirmed by the United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of Congo (Monusco), has stirred concern among locals who fear clashes between elements of the CNRD and other armed groups. “Since the end of March, we have been monitoring this situation and have increased our dissuasive presence. Peacekeepers have set up a temporary operational base at Bibatama, north-east of Bunyakiri, to monitor possible movements of armed groups including the CNRD,” a UN military source told us.

As for the Congolese army, military officials in South Kivu and Kinshasa told the KST, that they take “very seriously this threat to security”, fearing possible clashes on Congolese territory between these CNRD fighters and Rwandan troops who could be tempted to cross the border. At the end of May, Major General Delphin Kahimbi, head of Congolese military intelligence, visited Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu, to inquire into the situation. Before his return to the capital, the officer asked his officers to conduct further research into the situation in the Kalehe highlands. The Congolese government and its foreign partners are especially worried that these CNRD rebels may be joining forces with anti-Kigali armed groups in Uvira territory, thus contributing to a renewed cross-border conflagration.

The first official results of the military investigation are alarming and are related to broader regional tensions. In the immediate aftermath of the failed 2015 coup in Bujumbura, a proxy war was launched between Rwanda and Burundi through affiliated armed groups in the highlands of Uvira. While these dynamics dropped off significantly in 2016 and 2017, since the end of 2018 the situation has deteriorated dramatically. Security sources in the Congo accuse Rwandan soldiers of positioning themselves in Mibande, a Congolese village near Bijojo, after passing through Rurambo, in the Uvira highlands. In the same area, the Congolese military report the presence of Gumino, a militia that recruits in the Banyamulenge community and led by Colonel Alexi Shaka Nyamusaraba. This armed group allegedly benefits from military support from Bujumbura, receiving ammunition on several occasions in 2018, according a report by the UN panel of experts that leaked in early January.

According to the same Congolese security sources, Nyamusaraba’s fighters are in collusion with General Kayumba Nyamwasa, the former Rwandan army chief of staff exiled in South Africa, and is supported by the Burundian Imbonerakure, the armed and political militia of President Pierre Nkurunziza. On the other side of the battle field is a coalition of Red-Tabara––a group linked to a Burundian opposition party––and Congolese Mai-Mai groups based in the Fizi, Uvira and Mwenga highlands. In any case, the scene seems to be set up for an escalation of tensions between Kigali and Bujumbura. Although President Felix Tshisekedi visited Kigali on March 25th and hosted the the Chief of theStaff of the Rwandan army in Kinshasa on May 10th, and then visited President Pierre Nkurunziza in Bujumbura on June 14th, there has not been any official declaration that the Congolese government has a strategy for defusing this regional conflict.

 

What is behind the rise of crime in the Congo’s cities?

Since the beginning of the year, crime has risen in several cities in the Democratic Republic of Congo––a wave of kidnappings, grenade attacks, robberies, and murders. What is behind this?

Every month, the NGO Synergie des associations des jeunes pour l’éducation civique, électorale et la promotion des droits de l’homme au Sud-Kivu (SAJECEK) publishes a newsletter on the security situation in South Kivu. “Nine people killed, 46 houses attacked by armed bandits, 6 vehicles robbed, 14 kidnapping cases and 5 cases of popular justice” read their April report.

Robert Ndjangala, the coordinator of SAJECEK, says these statistics points to “a surge in crime in Bukavu.” Last month, in the capital of South Kivu alone his association recorded six burglaries, four kidnappings and one murder, on top of many other killings in Bukavu in recent months. In addition, citizens have lamented a trend of dead bodies appearing on streets and alleyways in the morning.

Via WhatsApp, Maschack Bilubi, Bukavu’s mayor, gave his explanation to the Congo Research Group (CRG). “These bodies often smell of alcohol. That makes us believe that the deaths are linked to heavy consumption of alcohol by street youth.” But the does not deny “the proliferation of targeted killings” and “the rise of banditry” which can be explained, according to him, by “the illegal circulation of small arms.” SAJECEK suggests that it is possible to purchase a small weapon in the city for $20 or $25.

Bukavu is part of the Congo that has been under the sway of national and foreign armed groups (Burundians, Rwandans and Ugandans) for more than two decades. “Some armed groups are reported in the outskirts of the city and their fighters do not hesitate to enter Bukavu to restock and look for money,” says Robert Ndjangala, who refers to “cases of grenade attacks and robbery of currency dealers in the middle of the day by masked armed men.” According to information collected by his NGO, other militiamen also rent out their services and “are recruited to perform dirty work, among other things, the settling of scores.”

In recent years, there have been several demobilization campaigns targeting these fighters. They have, however, never produced the desired results: the security of people and property and the pacification of this part of the country remain a distant objective. Since the inauguration of President Felix Tshisekedi, several armed groups have decided to surrender, but there is still no operational demobilization program. As a result, crime is being exported to major Congolese towns. “This is also the result of all the ex-combatants’ reintegration processes that have failed. As a result, abandoned to their fate, young people who have learned nothing other than the handling of weapons find themselves unemployed and do not hesitate today to resort to these criminal activities in the city,” explains Bilubi. Armed robberies, robberies, targeted attacks, murders, kidnappings are now part of the daily life in Bukavu.

This uptick in crime is noticeable in several other cities in the Kivus, including Goma (a parliamentary mission visited at the end of March to investigate crime here), Butembo and Beni. Since the beginning of the year, the Kivu Security Tracker (KST) has documented 42 people killed and 27 abducted in the cities of Bukavu, Butembo and Goma. Lubumbashi in the south of the country and Kananga in the center have also been affected. In Kisangani, the capital of Tshopo province, “the deterioration of the security situation in the city is mainly due to population movements,” according to Dismas Kitenge, president of Groupe Lotus, a local human rights NGO. “Young people, mostly from South Kivu, are working as motorcyle drivers in the city and are often cited as the perpetrators of robberies at night, even armed robberies and rapes,” he said.

More generally, Kitenge thinks the political and electoral context may play a role in this trend. In Kisangani as elsewhere, “young people were instrumentalized by politicians during the election campaign: candidates often used the big arms to secure their meetings, but also to disrupt the activities of political opponents. This has often exacerbated political tensions and led to attacks between rival groups,” he says.

Several other human rights defenders and civil society actors contacted also noted that local authorities are not perceived as legitimate. This questioning of local power could also, according to them, explain the rise of violence in cities. Add to this social discontent and grumblings within the army and police, who live are underpaid and live in poor conditions, thus becoming themselves sources of insecurity for civilians. “When they are deployed at night for patrols, many tell us that they take the opportunity to harass the population so they can support their wives and children the next day,” said Ndjangala who also deplores the lack of political will from the government.

In other countries, similar factors – thousands of ex-combatants, a weak state, and an abundance of weapons and ammunition – have created extraordinary waves of urban crime. In El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, decades of civil war have given way to the worst urban insecurity in the world. At the end of these wars, a large pool of demobilized and unemployed men with easy access to weapons have fueled organized criminal groups, particularly in El Salvador, which has the highest homicide rate in the world. In Guatemala, mafia groups have formed state intelligence and military forces.

In the Kivus, local city halls have started tackling the problem with their own means, as they wait for a more comprehensive approach from the national government. In Bukavu, for example, an urban security council is held every Wednesday of the week to assess the situation and adjust their security approach. “Nocturnal patrols are organized, random checkpoints are set up to search for thugs, a campaign to get rid of the kiosks and abandoned vehicles––possible hiding places for bandits––was launched and sensitization of local officials in neighborhoods are underway to identify newcomers,” saus Bukavu’s mayor.

However, these measures are not new. In early 2018, the government of South Kivu launched operations “Tujikinge” against insecurity in urban areas, but without being able to end the criminal gangs operating there.

Is the era of armed groups over?

During his trip to Goma on April 15 and in Beni on April 16, 2019, President Félix Tshisekedi, promised to do everything to ensure peace and security return to North Kivu, saying that the era of armed groups was over.

He announced several decisions, included to rotate out the troops who had been serving in the Kivus for many years; however, the dismantling of armed groups is likely to remain an uphill battle.

On the one hand, in the wake the December 30th elections, the list of armed groups willing to lay down their arms has grown longer. Following the surrender or capture of several armed group commanders in January and February, the leader of the Raia Mutomboki Kabishula (aka Ngubito), active in Ziralo grouping in Kalehe territory, surrendered with more than 400 combatants in Nyamunyunyu on March 5th; the Raia Mutomboki Safari, active in the Kalonge groupement, Kalehe territory, surrendered on March 26th; and Nyatura Kavumbi’s commander surrendered to the FARDC on April 2nd in Kirumbu, Masisi territory.

Talks are also underway for the surrender of other armed groups: with the Nyatura Kalume Matthias in Lumbishi, Kalehe territory, since mid-April; and with the Raia Mutomboki Maheshe on April 20th, in Nzibira  Walungu territory. The Nyatura Ngwiti are also reportedly en route to Muheto to surrender to the FARDC.

Still other commanders have been captured or killed: on January 3rd, the FARDC killed Lance Muteya in Nduma, Shabunda territory; the important Mai-Mai commanders Charles Bokande and Jackson Muhukambutho were both killed in attacks (by unidentified assailants) at Kamuhororo on February 3rd and Ishasha on April 21st, respectively, both in northeastern Rutshuru territory. The commanders of the Raia Mutomboki Kokodikoko and Raia Mutomboki Vunja Vikwazo were captured on April 14th in Shabunda territory, but their dependents are still at mostly at large.

 

However, it will be difficult for the government to consolidate these gains, for three reasons:

First, instead of disarming, some armed groups have taken advantage of their good relations with the FARDC to bolster their positions, becoming de facto self-governing entities: this is the case of Nduma Defense of Congo (NDC-R), which has extended its reach though new offensives in Masisi during the months of March and April 2019. The NDC-R’s strength has made it difficult to disarm them, and their collaboration with the FARDC has encouraged the mobilization of other armed groups.

Second, and probably the most important challenge, there is a striking lack of options for those who want to surrender. The National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program (PNDDR) has not been accepting any new demobilization candidates for several years. Those who surrender are sometimes placed in military camps––the main two such camps are in Nyamunyunyi, north of Bukavu; and Mubambiro, west of Goma––with little supervision, or are provided with simple demobilization tokens and returned to their villages. At the same time, the Congolese government is sending mixed signals. For example, on February 3rd, the rebel leader Ebuela arrived with dozens of combatants to surrender in Mikenge (Fizi territory), only to return to the bush after the FARDC attacked his troops who were preparing to disarm in Kafulo on March 2nd.

Finally, somewhat paradoxically, the death or capture of the commanders of some armed groups has deprived the FARDC of important interlocutors who could persuade their troops to demobilize. Some groups, following the removal of their commander, have fragmented into gangs of criminals operating without a clear command structure.