Does the New Disarmament and Demobilization Program Stand a Chance of Success? 

KST on September 16, 2021

Collected firearms for destruction in Goma (North Kivu) in November 2013 (Photo MONUSCO/South African Battalion).

By Reagan El Miviri, Analyst at the Kivu Security Tracker, and Pierre Boisselet, Coordinator at the Kivu Security Tracker.

In early August, DRC President Félix Tshisekedi appointed a national coordinator to head the new Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Reintegration and Stabilization Program (P-DDRCS). This type of program seems vital to place eastern DRC on the road to peace. However, all previous DDR attempts have largely failed. Will this time prove any different?

On August 7, 2021, President Tshisekedi appointed Emmanuel Tommy Tambwe Rudima to the position of National Coordinator of the new Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Reintegration and Stabilization Program (P-DDRCS), established one month earlier.

This announcement had been expected for months, even years. Since the failure of the third “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration” program in eastern DRC (DDR3) with a planned 2015 launch, but which was never effectively implemented, the country had been without a program of this kind. In December 2019, the UN Security Council had already “called upon” the Congolese government to “appoint a senior coordinator to address Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.” 

This type of program is therefore vital for progress on the path to peace in eastern DRC.

Why is a DDR Program Needed?

The largely military approaches, encouraged by Félix Tshisekedi since his arrival as president in January 2019, have still not resulted in the expected outcomes. At times, they have even worsened the situation, such as the “large-scale” offensive launched against the ADF at the end of October 2019, and which was followed by a wave of civilian killings, unprecedented since that of 2014-15.

The “state of siege” implemented in the provinces of Ituri and of North Kivu from May 6 this year, has not had the expected results either to date. This has in essence consisted of the transfer of large swathes of civil jurisdiction over to military or police governors, administrators and mayors. But civilian killings have continued since it came into being: at least 723 civilians have been killed by armed actors the North Kivu and Ituri since May 6 (cross-checks are still ongoing concerning the further killings occurring during this period). The ADF, the deadliest of the 122 armed groups listed by the KST in eastern DRC, are behind most of the killings (they are implicated in the deaths of at least 396 civilians). In recent months, its sphere of action has shifted towards the territories of Irumu and Mambasa in Ituri province. The armed forces and police are themselves implicated in the deaths of at 65 civilians.

As a result, the state of siege, which had the near-unanimous support of the political class at its launch at the end of April, is now facing criticism. Pointing to the lack of results and demanding that the minister of defense come before them to explain the situation, 90 national members of parliament boycotted the vote to prolong the state of siege on August 3.

In this context, could the new P-DDRCS or Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Reintegration and Stabilization Program bring peace to eastern DRC?

The negotiations entered into in recent months, between the FARDC and the armed groups of the Petit Nord (the territories of Nyiragongo, Rutshuru, Masisi, Walikale, and the south of that of Lubero), have resulted in surrenders. However, none of the main militia heads has, until now, handed himself in to the authorities, which makes such progress reversible. Also, previous surrenders show that such advances are rarely long-lasting without a properly funded and organized DDR program, which provides real support for combatants. Former combatants of the Nduma Defense of Congo-Rénové (NDC-R), billeted in Rumangabo (Rutshuru territory, North Kivu), have. for instance, carried out multiple lootings of the surrounding villages, such as on May 25 this year. Many of those who have surrendered have also returned to the bush and rejoined their armed group. Additionally, in the absence of a DDR program to replace them, most attempts at creating peace and mediation agreements in recent years have never got off the ground.

Since 2003, at least three DDR programs have been launched nationally, without any decisive progress. A significant number of the current members of armed groups have gone through such DDR programs before taking up arms again in a movement of “circular return” and a “recycling of rebels.”

Does this new DDRCS program have any chance of success when the previous ones have failed?

A Controversial New Coordinator

Initial reactions to the appointment of Tommy Tambwe to the position of national coordinator have not been very encouraging. His profile as a former senior member of the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD, of which he was Vice-President of South Kivu, in particular) and a leader of the Alliance for the Liberation of Eastern Congo (ALEC), both rebel movements backed by Rwanda, have caused hostility from members of civil society. Dr Denis Mukwege, a Nobel Prize winner, shared his “caution” and believed that “it was time to break with policies whose aim was to give promotions to those who should be brought to justice. In a press release, the NGO Human Rights Watch (co-founder of KST) opined that this appointment raises “serious concerns.”

Regarding armed groups, the news was hardly better received. The Collective of Movements for Change (CMC), one of the main militia coalitions in the Petit Nord and, as such, one of the significant targets of the P-DDRCS, declared their hostility to Mr. Tambwe who they describe as a “puppet” and “mercenary of the foreign invaders of our country.”

In South Kivu, Tommy Tambwe’s province, this appointment also seems to be problematic. Civil society organizations as diverse as the Solidarité des jeunes fuliiru (SOJEF) and the Banyamulenge Mutual Societies Coordination Committee have denounced his selection as the head of the P-DDRCS.

The new P-DDRCS National Coordinator rejects such criticism. During an interview with KST in Kinshasa on September 1, he promised that, as from his first trip to eastern DRC, his delegation would “improve the living conditions of those who had already surrendered,” and that “many new combatants would surrender and be welcomed.” This trip was to have taken him to the provinces of “Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Tanganyika and Maniema.”

Will the Donors Support the New Program?

Another challenge is to convince the donors to back the program. Tommy Tambwe has stated that the Congolese state will contribute its own funds to this program. “We have recovered 1.1 million USD from the budget lines of the STAREC and PN-DDRC,” [two institutions replaced by the P-DDRC], he specified to KST. “This would be used to become operational immediately but is insufficient. We are currently in talks with the executive to find further funds from the already approved 2021 budget. And we will also develop the budget for 2022.”

The level of state support therefore remains to be defined. There are justified fears that it remains insufficient without the help of foreign donors. DDR3 in particular had failed on that issue: potential funders, chastened by the suspicions of corruption and misappropriation of funds in previous programs, had believed that the necessary guarantees had not been forthcoming.

Does the international community have a positive view, at this point, of the new P-DDRCSy? Upon the presentation of the idea of a community DDR by the governors of North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri in October 2020, the Ambassadors of the European Union, United States, Great Britain and Canada had expressed their support.

However, an initial hitch occurred during the publication of the ruling establishing the P-DDRCS on July 4. A Western diplomat questioned by KST was unpleasantly surprised to discover that the structure of the program allocates less decision-making to the three regions the most affected by insecurity than he expected. He fears that centralizing the program jeopardizes its effectiveness.

Tommy Tambwe’s profile has also raised concerns in Western diplomatic circles in Kinshasa; such concerns have been strengthened by the reaction of civil society and armed groups. However, no foreign country has publicly criticized his appointment, leaving the door open for collaboration. According to a source close to the program, funders will not try to change the President’s mind on the subject of his appointment. It remains to be seen, however, whether they are willing to fund the program.

On August 24, in Kinshasa, Tommy Tambwe met with eight diplomatic delegations (those of the United States, United Kingdom, European Union and of several of its member states, in particular). Several sources who took part in this meeting have indicated that it went rather well: delegations had the feeling that their concerns had been taken on board by the new P-DDRCS Coordinator and his team. It is expected that they will be invited to join the steering committee.

But not all issues have been solved. According to a source at the World Bank, it has already rejected the idea of directly funding the P-DDRCS. This doesn’t mean that no funding will be provided for projects within the framework of this program, but the Bank – and all the diplomats in communication with KST – appear to want to avoid funding the national structure as such. In the long term this could cause problems by weakening the capacity of the P-DDRCS to administer its entire program, in particular with carrying out tasks such as the identification and monitoring of demobilized combatants. These funders however have not ruled out providing technical support to the program, along with MONUSCO, which has also undertaken to support the new program.

Which Strategy Should be Adopted? 

For the P-DDRCS to work, it also needs a strategy capable of having learnt from previous failures.

It has a few arguments in its favor. Firstly, the political context has changed compared with previous programs: after 18 years of Joseph Kabila’s reign, the rise to the head of the country of a president who has not taken part in armed conflicts in the last 20 years is a window of opportunity to convince armed groups to lay down their weapons.

The struggle against Joseph Kabila’s regime had long been the corner stone of the armed groups’ leader’s justification for taking up arms. Ever since the arrival of President Félix Tshisekedi in January 2019, several groups (in French) had spontaneously expressed the wish to join a DDR process to “serve” the country.

Also, if we were to wonder about the relevance of the state of siege in fighting against insecurity in the east, this is a measure of the will of the government to do something about this issue. As underlined by the government’s spokesperson in a Débat Africain podcast, the state of siege banks on its psychological effect: it shows the government’s commitment to put an end to armed group activities in the provinces concerned.

Another advantage of the P-DDRCS is that it is the fruit of the merging of STAREC and the National DDR Program, two institutions which were previously under two different ministries (Planning as regards the STAREC and Defense as regards the PN-DDR), which led to redundancies and conflicting competences.

However, who conducts security policies in eastern DRC has not been entirely clarified. This remains split between the P-DDRCS, under the presidency, the Ministry of Defense, led by Gilbert Kabanda, and the National Oversight Mechanism (NMS) of the Addis Ababa Framework Agreement, led by Claude Ibalanky.

Lastly, there remains the task of implementing a clear and convincing strategy. This program’s vocation is to be community-oriented. This is itself an interesting idea. In “Untangling the Gordian knot of insecurity”, the Rift Valley Institute proposed that in 2013 the previous program had been insufficiently community-oriented. The authors noted that by only targeting combatants, the DDR had undermined reconciliation efforts since “the communities that they return to had the impression that those who had taken up arms were being rewarded by giving them money and professional training.”

During his first trip to eastern DRC, Tommy Tambwe plans to “implement in each province “Consultation Frameworks for Peace Program Support” (CCAPs) with the authorities, civil society, customary chiefs, religious confessions, tribal mutual societies, NGOs, youth, women, etc.,” he told KST. “We do not want people to come and say afterwards that they had not taken part in the process,” he added.

“However, the strategy itself remains to be developed along with MONUSCO specialists,” he clarified.

The Dilemma Posed by Reintegration

This strategy will invariably collide with the social reintegration of combatants into communities and the issue of their possible integration into the armed forces.

Providing economic alternatives to former combatants is an essential part of reintegration into the community. However, such alternatives should be fit-for-purpose. In the past, reintegration programs led former combatants towards ill-adapted activities (work in mills, hairdressing, etc.), since they didn’t have the skills required to take on such roles.

Also, the ruling establishing the DDRCS specifies that integration into the armed forces will only be possible on an individual basis. This is a means of rejecting collective integrations, which have occurred in the past. Such military integration is seen as a red line by the international community and by civil society, as it perpetuates the cycle of violence and impunity by incentivizing the taking up of arms to eventually benefit from this type of program.

However, this intransigence may well be difficult to apply, particularly for the armed groups which have already started a demobilization process. This is the case, for instance, of the Union of Patriots for the Liberation of Congo (UPLC) or the Patriotic Resistance Front of Ituri (FRPI), which have received the promise that its members will be integrated into the army, along with recognition of their ranks. This is the basis upon which they accepted to remain billeted in camps. The hope of amnesty and integration into the FARDC is also often one the main motives for armed groups to surrender. According to some reports, the historic head of the Nduma Defense of Congo-Rénové (NDC-R), Guidon Shimiray, has recently proposed this type of condition prior to considering his surrender.

The new leaders of the P-DDRCS are faced with multiple challenges: convincing skeptical funders of their ability to develop an effective program; lead it to its successful implementation; and breaking with past practices whilst finding a way of motivating combatants to surrender. This will be no small challenge.

Can MONUSCO Really Withdraw From the DRC?

KST on December 11, 2019

A “Short Course on Vehicle Repair” given by the Indian contingent of MONUSCO in Lubero territory. (MONUSCO/Force)

Twenty years. On November 30, it was exactly twenty years to the day that the UN peacekeeping mission in DRC was born. No one, however, had the heart to celebrate this anniversary.

Since November 22, MONUSCO has been facing a popular uprising on a scale rarely seen in North Kivu. On November 25, one of its camps, in Beni’s Boikene neighborhood, was even partly destroyed by protesters. The protesters have accused the mission of inaction – and its most vocal critics of complicity –  during the killing of civilians in recent weeks.

The Kivu Security Tracker (KST) has recorded the deaths of at least 161 civilians by armed groups since November 5 in Beni territory. In the vast majority of cases, these abuses were carried out by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF, a Uganda-based Islamist rebellion), in all likelihood in retaliation for the “major offensive” launched on October 30 by the Congolese army.

During these violent demonstrations, Blue Helmets even opened fire, killing at least one civilian, who, according to the mission, “was about to throw a Molotov cocktail.” An investigation has been opened but this episode has played a part in further radicalizing the protests. They have even reached large towns: demonstrations have been organized by citizen movements such as Lucha in Goma and Kinshasa, calling for the UN mission to leave if it is unable to prevent the killings. In total, KST has logged the deaths of at least 15 people in recent demonstrations in Beni and Butembo.

The confidence of the Congolese in the ability of the mission to ensure their security has, in fact, waned in recent years. In answer to the question “Do you trust MONUSCO to ensure the security of your neighborhood/village?”, only 15% of Congolese polled in December 2018 by Peacebuildingdata.org replied in the affirmative (and only 14% for the inhabitants of North Kivu). This represents a fall of 11 points compared with 2015.

However, the current lack of confidence is occurring at a crucial moment when the future of the mission is under discussion at UN headquarters: its renewed mandate should be adopted before December 20. The mission’s budget, which was for a long time the largest in the world for a peacekeeping mission (it reached 1.45 billion dollars in 2013-2014), has dropped to 1.01 billion dollars, principally due to the reduction in UN funding by the United States. MONUSCO is now less well funded than MINUSMA in Mali or MINUSS in South Sudan.

In March, the Security Council had only renewed the mission in DRC for nine months, not the usual 12. French Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean-Yves le Drian had even announced that this shortened mandate would be used to plan for its “gradual disengagement.”  Meanwhile, a strategic review of the mission has been carried out by Tunisian diplomat Youssef Mahmoud. His report, whose conclusions were leaked to AFP (in French), argues for the mission’s withdrawal within three years.

Could it be that from New York to Beni, a convergence of interests of various kinds of frustration with the mission is leading to its untimely demise?

Some members of the mission are certainly demoralized by their scapegoating. MONUSCO is not responsible for the new wave of violence, as some have stated, particularly since the DRC Armed Forces (FARDC) denied it a role in planning their operations against the ADF.

On December 1, during his visit to eastern Congo, UN Peacekeeping Operations Chief Jean-Pierre Lacroix even stated that the attacks against the mission had been “premeditated, organized and financed” and called for “investigations into everything that has happened.”

Who orchestrated them? On condition of anonymity, some members of the mission revealed to KST that members of the Congolese army took part in fueling the protests against it, including by transporting protesters. KST has been able to verify that certain Congolese army officers have been spreading messages that are hostile to the Blue Helmets.

What was the aim of these officers in seeking to foment hostility against MONUSCO? Focusing criticism on MONUSCO could firstly hide their own responsibility. Also, most of those still in place at the head of the Congolese army were appointed by former President Joseph Kabila, who had called for the withdrawal of MONUSCO before 2020 (in French). Some Congolese officers are themselves under UN sanctions such as General Muhindo Akili Mundos, currently Commander of the 33rd military region (South Kivu and Maniema). According to a high-level UN source, Defense Minister Aimé Ngoy Mukena (who is close to former president Kabila), had still not signed the proposed new cooperation agreement between the FARDC and MONUSCO, even though the former agreement had expired in July.

This would not completely remove any responsibility on MONUSCO’s part. The attacks against civilians could have been anticipated. This armed group had already used this strategy during previous offensives, such as in 2014 (when 345 civilians had been killed in three months). Yet MONUSCO’s mandate defines protecting civilians as one of its two priorities (along with support for Congolese institutions).

Troops engaged on the ground in Beni territory are in reality ill equipped for this mission. In the main, these comprise some 300 Malawian, South African, and Tanzanian soldiers of MONUSCO’s Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), a combat force rather than a civilian protection force. This was created in 2013 to put an end to the M23 rebel movement, which was operating like a regular army. According to several diplomatic sources, it was borne of the will of southern African states to fight against Rwandan influence in the Kivus.

The FIB today must face a completely different enemy, using counter-insurgency techniques. According to the strategic review report, it is also facing “significant problems relating to unified command and control, intelligence, analysis, planning and coordination.”

Its troops have suffered heavy losses in Beni territory in recent years: 15 Blue Helmets were killed in the battle of Semuliki in December 2017. Then, during their last offensive against the ADF, in November 2018, eight Blue Helmets were also killed. Consequently, since then and despite instructions from the mission’s command, FIB patrols, under their own chain of command, with at its head, the South African General Patrick Dube, have become more cautious, including in towns of the Grand Nord of North Kivu.

Compounding this is the fact that the crisis has occurred during a transition at the head of the MONUSCO force: after the departure of its commander, the Brazilian Elias Martins, it found itself without a head. The new deputy commander, General Thierry Lion, who came to his post during the same period, therefore had to take on a dual role. This situation should, however, come to an end shortly: a new force commander, the Brazilian Ricardo Augusto Ferreira Costa Neves, was appointed on December 3.

How can the mission find a way out of this crisis? After the Beni protests, the office of the head of mission, Leila Zerrougui, called for a meeting with the highest Congolese authorities. A meeting of the National Security Council was held on November 25 in Kinshasa with the president of the republic, his ministers and several Congolese generals. It decided to resume “joint operations” between MONUSCO and the FARDC. However, beyond the public announcement, which might have calmed down the protesters, it remains difficult to identify the practical measures that this will involve.

Since then, the UN mission has released information on the support it already provides to the FARDC, mainly in the form of reconnaissance flights and the evacuation of wounded soldiers. It could increase its logistical support to Congolese forces but only to a certain extent: its budget already has a deficit of several million dollars according to the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General.

Joint “planning” meetings between MONUSCO officers and the FARDC were also held (in French) in Beni territory. MONUSCO announced the arrest of combatants as part of joint “combat patrols” with the FARDC (in French). However, its participation in conflicts with the ADF, in the air or on the ground, remains off the table for the time being, according to several diplomatic sources. Several UN officials believe the FARDC operation to be ineffective and badly prepared. They also fear finding themselves mixed up in possible abuses.

In this context, one option could be to suspend operations against the ADF, to provide time to develop a new joint strategy between the FARDC and MONUSCO. Only President Félix Tshisekedi could take such a decision. But it remains to be seen whether Congolese military chiefs would agree. Above all, it would risk appearing as a step backwards in the eyes of the people, and particularly damaging to the president’s image. He had committed to eliminating the ADF before the end of the year.

On a deeper level, there is a profound disconnect between what the Congolese expect of MONUSCO and what MONUSCO is able and willing to do. President Tshisekedi, who wants to keep MONUSCO, is calling for the mission’s military capacity to be reinforced. Among civil society, also, Lucha is calling for MONUSCO “to do something or leave.” Political opponent Martin Fayulu and Nobel Peace Prize winner Denis Mukwege, both of whom are in favor of the UN presence, are calling for military intervention in Beni territory based on the model of the European Artémis operation in 2003 in Ituri province. The underlying idea behind such calls is that a hard-hitting military offensive could quickly eliminate the ADF.

Conversely, several MONUSCO officials asked by KST believe that the mission is “not there to go to war” and that the use of force is only effective if it goes hand in hand with political and diplomatic initiatives. In its report, “The Art of the Possible: MONUSCO’s New Mandate,” the Congo Research Group recommended rebuilding “a viable political strategy for protecting civilians in zones of armed conflict.” Also, the recent independent strategic review indicates that “there is no military solution to many of the security crises in the DRC.” The report also states that “without such a critical re-examination, the mission will continue to be burdened with unrealistic expectations and short term remedies that unwittingly allow Congolese stakeholders to shirk their own responsibility for addressing the causes of conflict many of which are the result of homegrown governance deficits.”

The report even proposes the withdrawal of the FIB, particularly to underscore that “it would also send the signal that neutralization is a sovereign duty of the national army.” In the eventuality that this force is renewed, it should be renewed for no more than one year.

These proposals are now under discussion at the UN Security Council. A withdrawal in less than three years appears unfeasible: even if such a decision were taken, carrying it out would require more time. Moreover, the DRC is still affected by an Ebola epidemic, which risks gaining ground due to recent attacks against MONUSCO and agents of the riposte, such as that at Mangina on November 27.

It is possible, however, that the Security Council will call for this withdrawal to be planned. According to a diplomatic source, the United States, in particular, has expressed its desire for the creation and adoption of a withdrawal timeline.