In Ituri Province, the FARDC are Unable to Distinguish CODECO Militias from Civilians

KST on November 15, 2021

Mountains of Ituri province (Photo Monusco/Adeniyi Oluwo).

By Pierre Boisselet, Coordinator of the Kivu Security Tracker.

For four years, Djugu territory, in Ituri province, has been the site of a violent insurrection by the “CODECO” militia who the FARDC are unable to tell apart from civilians. Despite this, the authorities followed a nearly exclusively military strategy, further strengthened by the state of siege, at the risk of unwillingly bolstering their enemies.     

The Union des révolutionnaires pour la défense du Peuple Congolais (URDPC) is without doubt less well-known than other active armed groups in eastern DRC. And yet, this faction of the Cooperative for Development of the Congo (CODECO), which operates in Ituri province, is the most active armed group in all of eastern DRC. It has been implicated in at least 182 violent incidents since April, the month from when the Kivu Security Tracker (KST) started collecting data on this province.

During this period, it is true that the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) have killed more civilians – at least 600. However, the killings carried out by the URDPC are far from insignificant: at least 180 people have been killed by these militia members, which rank them as the second most deadly group for civilians.

The introduction of the state of siege on May 6 this year has not improved the situation. Even the DRC Armed Forces (FARDC) is frequently in difficulty. Between October 10 and 12, 28 soldiers were killed in violent clashes with the URDPC in the villages of Lipri, Ngangarai and Ngongo. On the 29th, CODECO militia members again killed 14 civilians in Gina.

So, how did we get here?

The Scars of History

CODECO is essentially active in Djugu, a territory of Ituri province long-scarred by community-based violence and tensions, effectively between the Hema and Lendu ethnic groups. This can be traced back to colonial times: steeped in racialist theories, the Belgian authorities supported the Hema community, whom they considered to be superior at the time, and who were mostly comprised of farmers (see the report “Violence and Instability in Ituri” by the GIC network), often to the detriment of the Lendu community, which is one of the largest of the province (just over 25% according to some estimates).

This heritage has shaped inequalities, particularly with regarding to land allocation and political power, and continues to have profound effects to this day. Djugu territory has four Hema “chiefdoms” (a type of collectivity with relative autonomy and hereditary power) whereas there are three Lendu “sectors” (bodies with less autonomy, with chiefs currently appointed by the state). The boundaries of these bodies are highly fragmented and isolate many of the Hema chiefdoms (below in orange) within Lendu sectors (in green).

Map taken from the “Administrative Organization Atlas of the Democratic Republic of Congo” by Léon de Saint-Moulin and Jean-Luc Kalombo Tshibanda, Centre for Social Action Studies, Kinshasa.

The racialist stereotypes developed under colonialism remain ingrained in the imagination of some of the current Congolese authorities. During an interview with the KST, a Congolese security forces officer stationed in Bunia described the Lendu in the following words: “they really are barbarians, bad guys, uncivilized Bantu. They are angry, they are there to get revenge, it’s in their blood. Even the Belgians said as much.”

After independence, the economic and political marginalization of the Lendu community continued, particularly during “Zairianization,” a process by which the Mobutu regime redistributed assets belonging to foreigners in the seventies. In Djugu, this included farms, given to influential Hema.

After the collapse of the Mobutu regime, and during the Second Congo War (1998-2003), Djugu territory escaped Kinshasa’s control, and became the site of extreme deadly conflict between community-based armed groups. Among them, of note were the Nationalist and Integrationist Front (FNI, essentially comprisred of Lendu) and the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC). Rwanda and Uganda, countries in conflict with one another, also contributed to feeding the conflict by supporting opposing armed groups.

The European Union’s operation “Artémis,” those of the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), as well as the dwindling influence of neighboring countries led to a considerable drop in the level of violence.

It is true that some armed groups remained active, such as the Patriotic Resistance Front of Ituri (FRPI) mainly composed of Ngiti (one of the constituent groups of the Lendu community). However, these were mainly based in the neighboring territory of Irumu and eventually signed a peace accord in February 2020 (in French).

“An Army, a Church, a Company”

As from 2018, a new wave of violence started in Djugu territory. Its origin is difficult to pinpoint, and the perpetrators have long remained unknown. However, some key events seem to have played their role, such as the death in unexplained circumstances of the Lendu priest, Florent Dunji, in July 2017, followed by protests by his community’s youth.

A first wave of violence occurred between the end of 2017 and March 2018, essentially against Hema villages, and a second, from September 2017, mainly against the FARDC. It was only in 2018 that the name CODECO, a reference to a former farming cooperative, emerged, as well as that of its leader, Mukwake Mambo, who was soon succeeded by Justin Ngudjolo – a cousin of the deceased priest.

According to Floribert Njabu, the moral authority of the FNI, who was able to enter into dialogue with the CODECO militia in 2020, members of CODECO present their movement as “an army, a church, and a company” all at the same time.

Specific beliefs and rites appear to have played a significant role in their mobilization. According to several sources, CODECO keeps specific days of rest – including Monday in particular. Data collected by KST partly confirms this tendency: out of 133 incidents started by the CODECO-URDPC logged between April 1 and October 13, only nine took place on a Monday, a number clearly lower than the average.

Number of incidents caused by the CODECO-URDPC since April, by day of the week

CODECO militia members do not clearly articulate their political demands, apart from their right to fight against the “harassment” by the FARDC who they accuse of having been “infiltrated” by foreigners, according to Floribert Njabu. Incidents caused by CODECO are not limited, however, to attacks against the FARDC: they have also committed many killings, particularly of Hema civilians.

Crucially, the authorities seem to be unable to discriminate between CODECO militia members and civilians from the community: four high-ranking officers whom KST interviewed for this blog post stated that both live side-by-side, inseparably in their view. A member of the former provincial government even described the ongoing conflict as a fight between the state and the Lendu community as a whole.

While there is certainly complicity between CODECO and some civilians, this assimilation is nevertheless refuted by many Lendu. Also, there are conflicts opposing different factions of CODECO, and militia members tax and commit abuses against Lendu civilians. The leader of the Bon Temple de Dieu (BTD, one of the CODECO factions), Thuwo, accused of committing abuse against his own community, was killed by members of the CODECO-URDPC on May 10.

Also, while there are armed groups comprising members of other communities in Djugu – particularly the Zaïre-Front Populaire d’Autodéfense en Ituri (FPAC, essentially Hema), they are relatively marginal in the conflict at this stage: they have only been identified as being implicated in four incidents in Djugu territory since April. “I have done all I can to stop the Hema from taking up arms,” explains Jean Bamanisa, himself from the Hema community on his mother’s side, and who was governor of Ituri until his removal in April 2021. “At the same time, this led the community to question their confidence in me because it was taking a long time to impose peace and stimulate development efforts.”

The Use of Force

In essence, the conflict can be summed up therefore as a confrontation between CODECO and the FARDC, with serious consequences for the territory’s civilians. The trend to criminalize the Lendu community in carries, in particular, the risk of promoting FARDC abuses against civilians. This is all the more significant that the Kinshasa government adopted a heavily militarized approach to this issue since Félix Tshisekedi arrived in power. This was initially the case with the launch of a military operation, “Zaruba ya Ituri” (“Ituri Storm”) following a visit by the president to Bunia in June 2019. The leader of CODECO, Justin Ngudjolo, was killed by the FARDC nine months’ later, in March 2020. However, this basically led to CODECO splitting into several factions with different strategies, which made any hope for dialogue much more complex. Apart from the URDPC, which is by far the most active faction and the above-mentioned BTD, there is also the Defense Force against the Balkanization of Congo (FDBC) or the Alliance for the Liberation of the Congo (ALC).

The operation was unsuccessful in bringing lasting stabilization to the situation. Faced with such a stalemate, the Kinshasa government appeared to have changed tactics by calling on former heads of Lendu groups, including Germain Katanga and Floribert Ndjabu, to try to enter into dialogue with CODECO militia members. This led to the signing of a unilateral deed of commitment by the URDPC (in French) and to a temporary drop in violence.

Nevertheless, in the absence of lasting dialogue and the disarmament program, the situation again deteriorated. In April 2021, Djugu became the most dangerous territory for civilians in all of eastern DRC, with 66 civilians killed, including 44 in incidents implicating CODECO-URDPC.

The introduction of the state of siege in Ituri and in North Kivu on May 6, 2021, again bolstered the military approach to the issue. FARDC activity has since increased markedly in Djugu, with highly publicized operations along National Road 27 (RN27) to dismantle the CODECO-held roadblocks.

Number of clashes implicating the FARDC in Djugu territory between April and October 2021

These operations, and the psychological effect of the state of siege, have managed to reduce violence in the weeks following its announcement. However, CODECO, which has not been dismantled, has retreated deeper into the territory. Many reports also mention a strengthening of their arsenal, including with PKM machine guns. After the respite of May, the number of civilians killed rose once again, attaining a level similar similar to that of April.

Number of civilians killed in Djugu territory, between April and October 2021

Despite its adoption in July, the new Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Reintegration and Stabilization Program (P-DDRCS) is not really seen as a credible strategy for Djugu. On the one hand, it does not seem able to implement concrete actions in the short term, particularly due to disagreements with the funders. On the other, several observers (Floribert Ndjabu, as well as MONUSCO intelligence sources) doubt that militia members can be persuaded by this program, which can offer neither amnesty, nor collective integration into the FARDC, nor have other specific requests entertained, due to its principles.

Once again, it is with an escalation in the use of force that the FARDC retaliated against an upsurge in attacks by the CODECO. Since July, they have used bombings by helicopter – a tactic which makes it particularly difficult to distinguish between civilians and combatants. Among the victims are several villages and civilians, such as in Kobu (7 civilians killed on August 18).

This attitude of widespread repression, which impacts the Lendu population, is partly accepted by some FARDC leaders (“People only are attracted to [those who are] the strongest. Therefore, we need to show that we are the strongest” explained a senior military officer to KST). Yet it has also led to the deaths of many FARDC (119 soldiers have been killed in Ituri between June and mid-September according to an internal document obtained by KST) and several officers recognize that currently the Congolese army has fewer troops than its enemies.

To mitigate for such losses and lack of troops, a contingent of the Republican Guard (GR) of approximately 1,200 men was deployed on September 10 in Bunia under the command of Brigadier general Jérôme Chico Tshitambwe. According to two officers when asked, it answers directly to the president’s office, which may cause difficulties in the chain of command, and deny them the field experience of soldiers who have been fighting for longer in the area.

The military approach to dealing with CODECO seems, in any case, to have also been adopted by the GR. On October 2, it launched an offensive in Lipri, which caused the deaths of eight soldiers and 21 civilians. The following day, the mother of the Yalala groupement chief, Live Malosi, was killed by the GR, who accused her of spying in the village of Kamba.

Has the FARDC changed its analysis of the conflict since then? Do they no longer have the means to pursue this offensive strategy? In any case, they appear to have again changed their approach, sending a delegation representing Chief of Staff Célestin Mbala to meet with the URDPC in Linga on Saturday, November 6. According to Radio Okapi, they were to propose to CODECO the “cessation of hostilities and [its integration into] the peace process.”

 

Is the “State of Siege” a Step in the Right Direction?

KST on May 11, 2021

Group of FARDC soldiers, on April 19, 2011, in North Kivu (Sasha Lezhnev/Enoughproject.org)

By Pierre Boisselet, Coordinator of the Kivu Security Tracker.

President Félix Tshisekedi has decreed a “state of siege” for one month, which will place the military and police in charge of the provinces of Ituri and North Kivu. Purely military approaches, however, have until now failed. But what should be done to restore peace to eastern DRC?

We now know more about the “state of siege”. Starting on May 6, and lasting initially for 30 days, the civil authorities of both provinces have been replaced by the military and the police. This includes the governors and vice-governors. Provincial government, provincial assemblies, local authorities and civil courts, have been suspended. The military has also been given special powers: including the power to prohibit or prevent publications, gatherings and even the presence of people they consider to be harmful to their actions. According to a UN source, these measures were taken without consulting the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO).

The head of state has appointed two lieutenant generals to lead the provinces affected by the state of siege: Johnny Nkashama Luboya for Ituri and Constant Kongba Ndima for North Kivu. Like many FARDC officers, both have been involved in rebellions in the past. Johnny Nkashama Luboya was the head of military intelligence for the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) at the start of the 2000s. His latest post was that of FARDC Commander of the First Zone of Defense. Constant Kongba Ndima was also known as the “board wiper”, in reference to the particularly violent operation led by the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) in Ituri at the beginning of the 2000s. At the time he was a general in that rebellion. His previous post in the FARDC was that of Deputy Commander of the General Staff in charge of administration and logistics.

There remain some areas of uncertainty in this measure. Dozens of FARDC officers are still to be appointed. However, the logic is relatively clear: to give full authority to the Congolese army in these provinces. The message is just as clear: President Félix Tshisekedi is aware of the deterioration of the situation and wishes to wipe out the armed groups in the east. This is an extremely ambitious program, therefore, for a measure also described as time-bound.

It is perfectly true that the situation is becoming worse for civilians in eastern DRC. This trend is very clear from the data collected by the Kivu Security Tracker (KST) on the provinces of North and South Kivu. In 2018, KST recorded 914 civilian deaths caused by armed actors. In 2019, this toll had risen to 1070. In 2020, it was 1569. And 2021 has started more or less on the same trajectory as 2020.

Number of civilians killed by armed actors per year in the Kivus since 2018

From this viewpoint, Félix Tshisekedi’s determination is understandable. He has made restoring peace in the east a central element of his communication both during his 2018 electoral campaign and since the start of his presidency. The head of state’s focus on this issue is, in itself, a good thing: Congolese and International political leaders often neglect the problems which plague eastern DRC.

This measure is also a response to very serious concern among public opinion. According to a poll (to be published) by the Congo Research Group (CRG) and the Bureau d’Études, de Recherches, et Consulting International (BERCI), carried out on March 19 and 20, 2021 across the country, 20% of respondents believe that security should be the government’s priority, which ranks this issue in second place behind “social/living conditions”, and ahead of “economy/jobs”. Throughout the month of April, there were protests (including in North Kivu) which not only called for MONUSCO to leave but also for the president to keep his word.

The Military Option

The voice of the protesters appear, therefore, to have been heard. But is the state of siege the right solution to their concerns? To find out, a useful starting point would be to take stock of what has already been done to address problems in the east under Félix Tshisekedi’s presidency.

Since the beginning of his mandate, the head of state has appeared to approach the east’s problem from an essentially military angle. He declared that he was ready to “die” to restore peace. When he tried to forge a regional coalition to restore security in September and October 2019, this was designed as joint command body for the region’s armies to plan military operations in eastern DRC.

Under the authority of the president, operations such as Zaruba ya Ituri (Ituri Storm) in the Djugu territory in June 2019, or the “large-scale” FARDC offensive against the ADF involving some 20,000 troops in October 2019 have been launched. Yet MONUSCO were not consulted or involved in the planning of these offensives and in the end, the region’s countries did not take part, since the joint command body project failed.

Concomitantly, it is true that non-military initiatives have been implemented, such as the Murhesa ceasefire process, community dialogue in the high and middle plateaus of South Kivu, or the attempt to rebuild the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program with a newfound focus on “communities”. However, in general the central government was not the instigator of such initiatives. Although sometimes it has endorsed them – with varying degrees of enthusiasm, particularly during the period when it was itself divided –until now it has not shown the will to prioritize such initiatives. The new “community” focused DDR approach, for example, was launched by eastern provincial governors. In 2020 Félix Tshisekedi publicly supported it and announced the appointment of a national coordinator to manage the process. Several international donors committed to DDR have expressed their readiness to financially support the scheme. But the decree providing for its implementation, which he has received, remains unsigned. This delay is all the more damaging given that the aim of the “state of siege” is to enable more offensives against armed groups: it would have been useful to first ensure that a framework was in place to deal with disarmed combatants.

It is clear: since the start of Félix Tshisekedi’s presidency a military approach has been adopted. How successful has it been? Data collected by KST calls into question its effectiveness and could even suggest the approach has been counterproductive in some territories.

A Counterproductive Operation

In Djugu territory, where the Zaruba ya Ituri Operation was launched in June 2019, KST data is limited as data collection only began in April 2021. However, initial indications are concerning: in April, Djugu was the most dangerous territory for civilians in eastern DRC. KST recorded 66 violent civilian deaths in the space of one month (more than the 47 civilian deaths in Beni territory over the same period). Djugu, which is only one of the 18 territories monitored by KST, accounted for 33% of all civilian deaths in April.

How does this compare to Beni, the territory targeted by the “large-scale” operation launched in October 2019? The FARDC leadership has very quickly announced the retaking of main ADF bases. However, data mapped by KST suggest that most of the combatants were able to flee to other areas. Some towns located on the borders of Beni territory, such as Mandumbi, Mamove or in the sector of Rwenzori, which until then had been relatively unscathed by ADF violence, saw a dramatic increase in civilian killings after the launch of the operation.

Location of killings carried out by the ADF in Beni territory before the “large-scale” intervention (June 2017-October 2019) and since then (November 2019-April 2021)

When the number of civilians killed in Beni territory is exposed and explored, the operation also appears to have been counterproductive until now. A monthly average of 24 civilians killed by armed actors between June 2017 and October 2019 escalated to an average of 65 following the start of the operation.

Number of civilians killed by armed actors in Beni territory per quarter since July 2017

A small but significant part of this was also due to an increase in violence by the FARDC and the National Congolese Police (PNC): either institution is implicated in the deaths of 4 civilians on average per month since the beginning of the operation, compared with 2 prior to it being put into effect.

However, abuses recorded in Beni territory are still overwhelmingly committed by the ADF – in so far as those responsible can be told apart. In all likelihood, the aim of such killings is to discredit and put pressure on the Congolese authorities, to divide the forces pursuing them and to divide society as a whole. In this way the ADF appear to want to inhibit FARDC operations so they can return to their safe havens. However, until now the Congolese government has not been able to contain this strategy: MONUSCO was the target of mass protests in November 2019 and in April 2021, resulting in clashes which led to at least 25 people being killed in North Kivu province.

Further Dangers

The results of the military approach favored by President Félix Tshisekedi, which are at best mixed, raise concern as to the consequences of the “state of siege”. This measure is in fact a continuation and strengthening of the method applied until now, rather than a new approach. This exceptional state also entails further dangers. The military, which have the capacity to prohibit protests, publications and to determine whether certain people are allowed to stay, will have greater autonomy and less accountability to justify their action than before. Both generals appointed as heads of the provinces by Félix Tshisekedi are also suspected to have been implicit in human rights’ violations according to a UN document seen by KST, which could jeopardize their collaboration with MONUSCO, since the mission operates in such matters under a policy of “due diligence”. This might be all the more damaging given the ongoing reform of MONUSCO’s Intervention Force Brigade (FIB) which will allow it to carry out interventions more frequently. At least some of the Kenyan troops, whose arrival was announced by Félix Tshisekedi during his visit to his counterpart, Uhuru Kenyatta, on April 21, are to be integrated into the FIB. However, to be able to act effectively, cooperation with the FARDC is vital.

Moreover, some FARDC members have ambiguous relationships with armed groups: complicity exists, sometimes at a high and structural level, as the CRG has evidenced concerning the Nduma Defense of Congo-Rénové, NDC-R, an armed group operating in North Kivu). Some members of the FARDC also profit from illicit economic activities. Reducing checks and balances by limiting the right to protest and criticize the operations might once again exacerbate the situation. Additionally, it must be questioned whether it will it be in the interest of the members of the military who now yield provincial power – and control of its associated resources – to bring violence to an end, which would most likely result in them losing their positions. It is therefore possible that the state of siege destabilizes the area, rather than stabilizes it.

Comprehensive Strategy

This does not mean, of course, that nothing should be done to deal with the situation in eastern DRC. Congolese public opinion concerns about the situation are legitimate and call on everyone to try and come up with answers.

Firstly, the Congolese government needs to formulate a comprehensive strategy, which goes beyond exclusively military solutions. This should be based on an in-depth and detailed analysis of the causes of the conflict and the role that each series of actors play in its perpetuation. The aim would be to identify the conflict’s deep-rooted drivers and to provide relevant solutions.

The situation’s causes are numerous and varied: the absence of state and public services in some areas, a lack of institutions that are accepted to solve local conflicts by non-violent means and that are perceived as neutral, the lack of armed groups member’s interest to leave their ranks, the perpetuation of illicit economic channels at a provincial and regional level, the complicity with armed groups at various state levels, the difficulty in cooperation with MONUSCO, the insufficient means and training provided to the FARDC and PNC…

Such an analysis would in particular lead to questioning the role of some members of the army and police in the conflicts, including in abuses, illicit economic channels and their links to armed groups. What is needed is to strengthen the means by which transparency is ensured and such excesses limited: for example, effective and incorruptible military inspections and tribunals, the capacity of the justice system to investigate such matters, a respected freedom of the press, the ability of civil society to denounce abuses without fear of repression, etc.

The role of the FARDC is both inescapable and indispensible. However, this must be achieved in a context which ensures its professionalism and inclusion within a comprehensive strategy. Also, in order to dismantle armed groups and put in motion a transitional demobilization and justice programme at national and regional level, reforms and action plans of other state services are required, particularly for the intelligence service, the PNC, the justice system and in diplomacy.

Efforts to define such a strategy have been made. The mechanism for monitoring the Addis-Abeba Agreement has for example led to the publication of a roadmap in September 2020. This should be supplemented and clarified, but has the merit of insisting on pursuing military and non-military approaches side-by-side and provides some useful analyses and proposals. However, similarly to the community DDR program, its adoption is pending a presidential decree.

Defining and implementing a comprehensive strategy is a long-term endeavor, which requires the constructive, patient and ongoing involvement of the highest levels of government. It will only deliver results in the long term at best. Yet President Félix Tshisekedi is in an advantageous position to address the problem. He now has a large political majority and a government willing to break with past practices. His new Minister of Defense, Gilbert Kabanda Kurhenga, has made the “restoration of ethics” within the FARDC his priority. Moreover, there is a new head of MONUSCO, Bintou Keita, and a new commander, General Marcos De Sa Affonso Da Costa, has been appointed. In September, he will head a strengthened and reformed FIB. There is now a window of opportunity for a more comprehensive and effective policy.